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In recent times, the relation between international trade and 
intellectual property (“IP”) enforcement has become a controversial 
topic in international law. On one hand, most IP exporting countries 
point to increasing trade in counterfeits and fake goods as the 
primary factor which destroys markets for the originals and deceives 
consumers into buying fake and sometimes even dangerous products. 
The lack of adequate IP enforcement at home, and especially in 
markets abroad, is identified as a key obstacle to international trade 
in IP protected goods. New and ambitious international rules on civil, 
criminal, border, and internet IP enforcement are therefore viewed as 
the main remedy to restore fair global competition and facilitate trade 
in legitimate goods and services worldwide. 
Most developing countries, on the other hand, take a different 
view: as their goods and services are becoming increasingly 
competitive with those of developed country producers, new and 
more stringent international IP enforcement rules seek to introduce a 
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new set of non-tariff barriers to trade that will preponderantly hinder 
developing country exporters. Even if agreements such as the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”) do not directly bind 
developing countries that are not parties to the treaty, implementing 
the new IP enforcement rules in the ACTA negotiating countries 
affects the majority of all goods traded internationally. IP 
enforcement at the border has the potential to create barriers to trade 
in goods not even destined to the markets of future ACTA countries. 
For example, when applied to goods in transit, the IP protection and 
enforcement standards in the transit country can cause detention and 
seizures—even if there is no IP infringement in the country of 
production or destination. Some developing countries consider such 
enforcement measures as protectionist and their trade restrictive 
effects as contrary to the main principle of trade liberalization in the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”). 
This article examines these arguments on the trade restrictive 
effects of the new international “gold standards” in IP enforcement. 
Parts I and II describe the seizures of generic medicines in transit 
through E.U. ports. This has led India and Brazil to challenge the 
consistency of the seizures with obligations under WTO Agreements 
on trade and IP protection. A key insight is that this dispute is based 
on the notion that the WTO TRIPS Agreement contains not only 
minimum, but also maximum standards for IP enforcement. In Part 
III, the ACTA provisions on border measures are examined as to 
whether they do create trade barriers, in particular whether they 
mandate or allow seizures of generic medicines in transit. The 
analysis not only takes a close look at various provisions affecting 
the scope of border measures, but further scrutinizes the impact of 
the applicable law rule in ACTA and the safeguards it foresees 
against IP enforcement functioning as a trade barrier. Part IV builds 
on the analysis by examining whether there exists any conflict 
between the ACTA TRIPS-plus enforcement standards and the free 
trade and access to medicines safeguards in the TRIPS Agreement. 
This analysis leads to the conclusion that, while the principle of 
harmonious interpretation minimizes direct conflict with TRIPS as a 
matter of international law, the policy choices underlying ACTA 
raise systemic concerns. Instead of including a few general checks 
and balances for the defendant, ACTA should give as much attention 
to specific safeguards for all interested parties affected by its 
648 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:3 
enforcement rules as it gives to concise and comprehensive new 
remedies for right holders. 
I. SEIZURES OF GENERIC DRUGS IN TRANSIT 
THROUGH E.U. PORTS 
Starting in 2008, Dutch authorities decided to seize, delay, and 
return several shipments of generic drugs transiting E.U. ports en 
route to destinations in South America and Africa on account of 
suspected patent infringements.1 The shipments predominantly 
originated in India and were all destined for developing countries 
such as Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, or Nigeria. The drugs at 
issue were protected in the E.U., but apparently not in the countries 
of origin or destination. Citing complaints of suspected infringement 
from alleged owners of patents or supplementary protection 
certificates, customs authorities in the Netherlands have detained a 
substantial amount of generic medicines in transit through the 
Netherlands.2 These consignments were initially detained and 
subsequently destroyed, returned to the country of origin, or, in a few 
cases, permitted to proceed to the destination country after 
considerable delay.3  
 
 
 1. See Reese Ewing, Brazil to Object to Dutch Seizure of Generic Drug, 
REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2327254 
420090123 (discussing Brazil’s frustration with Dutch authorities for seizing a 
shipment of Losartan, a generic high blood pressure medicine, because of an IP 
rights claim by a Netherlands-based company); see also Int’l Ctr. for Trade & 
Sustainable Dev. [ICTSD], Dutch Seizure of Generic Drugs Sparks Controversy, 
13 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., no. 3, Jan. 28, 2009, at 5, available at 
http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly13-3.pdf (stating that Brazil 
believes the Netherlands’ actions represent a “distorted use of the international 
intellectual property system” and present a setback to universal access to 
medicine); William New, Alarm Escalates Over Delayed Generic Drug Shipments 
as Action Sought, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 6, 2009, 5:13 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/ 2009/03/06 /alarm-escalates-over-delayed-generic-drug-
shipments-as-action-sought/ (noting a statement from health professionals, 
including Oxfam International and Health Action International, condemning the 
Dutch seizure as a risk to the “critical treatment” of HIV-positive Nigerian 
patients). 
 2. See Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member 
State Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010) 
[hereinafter India Consultation Request]. 
 3. See id. at 1 ("Available evidence confirms that the customs authorities 
seized at least 19 consignments of generic drugs in 2008 and 2009 while in transit 
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One example is the hypertension drug losartan potassium, 
manufactured as a generic in India by Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories and 
patented for the E.U. territory by DuPont and Merck Sharp & 
Dohme. In December 2008, Dutch custom authorities detained a 
consignment of losartan medication in transit to Brazil at Schipol 
Airport in Amsterdam.4 Due to threats of destruction by the right 
holder, the consignment was subsequently returned to India. Similar 
action was taken as regards, for example, generics for the drugs 
clopidogrel, abacavir, olanzapine, and rivastigmine.5 In all cases, the 
Dutch authorities acted pursuant to the European Communities 
Council Regulation No. 1383/2003 on border measures (“BMR”).6 
The public health dimension of the transit seizures is probably best 
demonstrated by the following incident: about three months after the 
controversial losartan detention occurred, an UNITAID7 funded 
shipment consisting of forty-nine kilograms of abacavir sulfate 
tablets was confiscated at Schiphol Airport by Dutch customs 
authorities under the claim that it contained counterfeit goods.8 The 
medicines, manufactured by the Indian company Aurobindo, are 
used in second-line treatment of HIV/AIDS in Nigeria for a program 
implemented by the Clinton Foundation on behalf of UNITAID. 
UNITAID protested sharply, insisting that the shipment did not 
contain counterfeit drugs or any other goods infringing on IP rights, 
and that the medication was prequalified by the World Health 
 
through the Netherlands, 16 of which originated in India."). 
 4. See id. at 4. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See Council Regulation 1383/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7, 9 (EC) (stating 
that customs authorities are permitted to detain or suspend the release of goods for 
a period of three working days if they suspect infringement of an intellectual 
property right to allow a “right-holder” to submit an application for customs 
action). 
 7. UNITAID is an international drug purchase facility established in 2006 to 
provide long-term, sustainable, and predictable funding to increase access and 
reduce prices of diagnostics and quality drugs for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, and tuberculosis in developing countries. It was founded by France, 
Brazil, Chile, Norway, and the United Kingdom, and it is hosted and administered 
by the World Health Organization (“WHO”). See How UNITAID Came About, 
UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/about/-background-mainmenu-18/159.html 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 8.  See UNITAID Statement on Dutch Confiscation of Medicines Shipment, 
UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/resources/news/156-unitaid-statement-on-
dutch-confiscation-of-medicines-shipment.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
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Organization (“WHO”) and had received tentative approval by the 
United States Food and Drug Administration.9  
The incident occurred shortly before a TRIPS Council Meeting on 
March 3-4, 2009 where India and Brazil issued strong statements 
against the European Communities (“EC”) border measures and 
threatened legal action under the WTO dispute settlement system as 
a last resort.10 Responding to an earlier EC statement in the WTO 
General Council that downplayed the Lortasan seizure,11 Brazil 
pointed out that the amount temporarily seized would have been 
enough to treat 300,000 patients suffering from hypertension for a 
full month.12 It further alleged that some of the earlier seizures in the 
Netherlands led to the destruction of the consignments concerned.13 
Brazil finally argued that these actions severely hamper medicine 
distribution to needy populations, given the risk that on key transit 
routes supplies may be regularly intercepted based on the assertion of 
patent infringement in the transit country.14 
Apart from India and Brazil, several NGOs and some 
commentators view the EC border measures as “contrary to the letter 
and spirit of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health,” as 
 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Statement by Brazil, TRIPS Council, Agenda Item ‘M’ (Other 
Business) Public Health Dimension of TRIPS Agreement (Feb. 3-4, 2009), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/intervention-by-
brazil.pdf, 1, ¶¶ 11, 16 [hereinafter Statement by Brazil] (claiming that the Dutch 
actions violated WTO principles because the medicine detained was not patent-
protected in either the exporting countries or the importing country); see also 
Intervention by India, TRIPS Council, Agenda item 'M' (Other Business) Public 
Health Dimension of the TRIPS Agreement (Feb. 3-4, 2009), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/ intervention-by-india.doc 
[hereinafter Intervention by India] (claiming that the confiscation of the generic 
medicines by the Dutch has a direct and negative impact on the legitimate trade of 
generic medicines, public health, and universal access to medicine). 
 11. See WTO General Council, Any Other Business (Feb. 3, 2009), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/files/WTO_GENERAL_COUNCIL.doc (asserting that 
the Dutch authorities only temporarily detained the medicine to control it as 
allowed by TRIPS and E.U. customs law and that the authorities were under no 
obligation to return the medicine to India). 
 12. See Statement by Brazil, supra note 10, ¶ 6 (noting that even though the 
shipment’s size is not relevant in ascertaining the gravity of the Dutch seizure, the 
potential benefits of the medications in question were extensive). 
 13. See id. ¶ 8. 
 14. See id. ¶ 9. 
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potentially countering efforts under the WTO’s so-called “paragraph 
six mechanism” to export drugs produced under a compulsory 
license into countries with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capacity, and as inconsistent with resolutions issued by the WHO 
and the EC Parliament.15 
II. WTO COMPLAINTS BY INDIA AND BRAZIL 
On May 12, 2010, India and Brazil initiated separate WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings against the E.U. and the Netherlands by 
requesting consultations over the seizures of generic medicines in 
transit.16 These requests for consultations are the first step under the 
WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”).17 Since the consultations failed to 
settle the dispute within sixty days after the date of receipt of the 
request for consultations, India or Brazil may request the 
establishment of a panel,18 which would then issue a report on the 
consistency with obligations under the WTO Agreements of the 
seizures of generics, the BMR as such, and its application in the 
cases described above in Part I.19 Later, in May 2010, Canada, 
Ecuador, China, Japan, and Turkey requested to join the 
 
 15. See Frederick M. Abbott, Worst Fears Realised: The Dutch Confiscation of 
Medicines Bound from India to Brazil, 13 BRIDGES, no. 1, Feb.-Mar. 2009, at 13, 
available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridges/ 44192/ (claiming that the confiscations 
are an exaggerated approach to intellectual property law and raising concerns that 
legitimate trade may fall under attack as well); Letter from Christian Wagner-
Ahlfs, BUKO Pharma-Kampagne et al., to Pascal Lamy, Dir. Gen., World Trade 
Org. (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://keionline.org/misc-docs/seizures/ 
WTO_seizures_18feb.pdf (noting that intellectual property right claims conflict 
with the ability to provide “access to medicine for all” and with the ability of 
organizations to properly address public health issues). 
 16. See India Consultation Request, supra note 2; Request for Consultations by 
Brazil, European Union and a Member State Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, 
WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010) [hereinafter Brazil Consultation Request]. 
 17. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art. 4(2), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (stating that 
each member must allow sufficient opportunity for consultation on any complaints 
made by another member regarding any activity affecting an agreement in the first 
member’s territory). 
 18. See id. art. 4(7). 
 19. See India Consultation Request, supra note 2, at 1-2; Brazil Consultation 
Request, supra note 16, at 2-3. 
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consultations in accordance with DSU Article 4(11).20 The 
“substantial trade interests” required by DSU Article 4(11) were, 
inter alia, based on exports of generic drugs to a large number of 
countries worldwide, on issues of public health and access to 
medicines, and on the fact that drugs destined to the requesting 
country had been seized in the E.U.21 All these requests were 
subsequently accepted by the E.U.22 At the time of writing, neither 
Brazil nor India has requested the establishment of a panel or 
notified the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) of a mutually 
agreed solution.  
A. ALLEGED INCONSISTENCIES WITH WTO/TRIPS PROVISIONS 
Brazil considers the above-mentioned measures as inconsistent, 
inter alia, with the following WTO provisions: 
 
1. Articles V:1, V:2, V:3, V:4, V:5, V:7 and X:3 of the GATT 1994; 
2. Articles 1.1, 2, 28, 31, 41.1, 41.2, 42, 49, 50.3, 50.7, 50.8, 51, 52, 53.1, 
53.2, 54, 55, 58(b), and 59 of the TRIPS Agreement, and Article 4bis of 
the Paris Convention of 1967; 
 
 20. See Dispute Settlement DS409: European Union and a Member State 
Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit (Brazil), WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds409_e.htm (last updated June 22, 2010) [hereinafter 
Brazil WTO Dispute]; see also Dispute Settlement DS408: European Union and a 
Member State Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit (India), WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds408_e.htm (last updated 
June 22, 2010) [hereinafter India WTO Dispute]. 
 21. See, e.g., Request to Join Consultations by Canada, European Union and a 
Member State Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS409/2 (June 1, 2010) 
(stating that Canada exports forty percent of its generic drugs to other countries 
because Canada supports and is active on the issues of public health and access to 
medicine); Request to Join Consultations by China, European Union and a 
Member State Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS409/6 (June 3, 2010) 
(noting that China produces a large quantity of generic drugs and is a bilateral 
trade partner of the E.U. and the Netherlands); Request to Join Consultations by 
Ecuador, European Union and a Member State Seizure of Generic Drugs in 
Transit, WT/DS409/3 (June 2, 2010) (explaining that generic drugs shipped to 
Ecuador were seized in the E.U.’s territory, causing Ecuador to believe that 
shipments of drugs to Ecuador may be intercepted in the future). 
 22. See Brazil WTO Dispute, supra note 20; India WTO Dispute, supra note 20 
(reporting that the E.U. had accepted the requests of Canada, China, Ecuador, 
India, Japan, and Turkey to join the consultations). 
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3. Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement23 
India in turn provides more concrete arguments on inconsistencies 
of the measures with some specific provisions of WTO law, 
including:  
1. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of Article V of the GATT 1994 because the 
measures at issue, inter alia, are unreasonable, discriminatory and 
interfere with, and impose unnecessary delays and restrictions on, the 
freedom of transit of generic drugs lawfully manufactured within, and 
exported from, India by the routes most convenient for international 
transit; 
2. Article X of the GATT 1994, including, without limitation, Article X:3, 
because the measures at issue, inter alia, are not administered in a 
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner; 
3. Article 28 read together with Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
Article 4bis of the Paris Convention, 1967 and the last sentence of 
paragraph 6(i) of the Decision of the General Council of August 30, 2003 
on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (the “August 30, 2003 Decision”) 
because a cumulative reading of these provisions confirms, inter alia, that 
the rights conferred on the owner of a patent cannot be extended to 
interfere with the freedom of transit of generic drugs lawfully 
manufactured within, and exported from, India; 
4. Articles 41 and 42 of the TRIPS Agreement because the measures at 
issue, inter alia, create barriers to legitimate trade, permit abuse of the 
rights conferred on the owner of a patent, are unfair and inequitable, 
unnecessarily burdensome and complicated and create unwarranted 
delays; and  
5. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement read together with the provisions of 
the August 30, 2003 Decision because the measures at issue, inter alia, 
authorise interference with the freedom of transit of drugs that may be 
produced in, and exported from, India to Members of the World Trade 
Organization with insufficient or no capacity in the pharmaceutical sector 
that seek to obtain supplies of such products needed to address their 
public health problems by making effective use of compulsory 
licensing.24 
 
 23. See Brazil Consultation Request, supra note 16, at 4. 
 24. See India Consultation Request, supra note 2, at 2-3. 
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India considers further: 
[T]hat the measures at issue also have a serious adverse impact on the 
ability of developing and least-developed country members of the World 
Trade Organization to protect public health and to provide access to 
medicines for all. Accordingly, the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 
referred to above must be interpreted and implemented in light of the 
objectives and principles set forth in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, the Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health adopted on 14 November 2001 and in the light of 
Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which recognizes the right of all persons to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.25 
This article does not purport to offer a comprehensive analysis of 
all the alleged inconsistencies between the seizures of generic 
medicines in transit and WTO law.26 Instead, it shall be limited to 
some thoughts on potential violations of TRIPS provisions as these 
may effectively serve as an important international law benchmark to 
assess the border measure provisions in ACTA. 
B. TRIPS AS A BENCHMARK CONSTRAINING ADDITIONAL IP 
PROTECTION 
Interestingly, both India and Brazil argue that the E.U. and Dutch 
measures at issue not only infringe on obligations under the 
WTO/GATT rules on trade in goods,27 but also are inconsistent with 
 
 25. Id. at 3. 
 26. For an analysis of some of the IP, trade, and public health issues under 
WTO law, see generally XAVIER SEUBA, FREE TRADE OF PHARMACEUTICAL 
PRODUCTS: THE LIMITS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT AT THE 
BORDER 1-42 (2010), available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2010/04/ 
seuba_web_10.pdf; Shashank P. Kumar, Border Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights Against In-Transit Generic Pharmaceuticals: An Analysis of 
Character and Consistency, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 506, 511-518 (2010). 
 27. Here, the potential of border measures against goods in transit to serve as a 
barrier to international trade and the freedom of transit makes an infringement of 
GATT Article V a possible scenario: the “Freedom of Transit” clause in GATT 
Article V(2) stipulates that “[t]here shall be freedom of transit through the territory 
of each contracting party, via the routes most convenient for international transit, 
for traffic in transit to or from the territory of other contracting parties.” See 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. V(2), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. This is, however, subject to compliance “with 
applicable customs laws and regulations” and the potential invocation of a general 
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several provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. In at least one aspect, 
this is a novel type of dispute. For the first time in WTO dispute 
settlement history, TRIPS is used as a benchmark for constraining 
additional (“TRIPS-plus”) IP protection. According to both India’s 
and Brazil’s consultation requests, the E.U. and Dutch measures are 
argued to be inconsistent with, inter alia, TRIPS Article 1(1), Article 
41, and other norms from the TRIPS section on border measures 
(Articles 51-60). The crucial point is that these alleged infringements 
do not result from failure to meet the TRIPS minimum standards of 
IP protection and enforcement.  
Instead, it is the TRIPS-plus nature that caused the seizure of 
generics in transit. The legal basis for the transit seizures, the BMR, 
goes beyond the TRIPS minimum standards in several aspects. For 
one, the BMR covers not only “trademark counterfeit goods” and 
“pirated copyright goods” as defined in TRIPS;28 it covers 
infringements of other IP rights such as patents.29 The BMR further 
mandates border measures against goods in transit30 and those 
destined for exportation under BMR Article 1(1). TRIPS, on the 
other hand, demands such measures only against imports.31 In 
addition to alleging inconsistency of the BMR as such, the 
consultation requests also argue that its application to generic drugs 
in transit by the Dutch custom authorities violates TRIPS 
obligations.32 
These complaints challenge one of the central elements of 
international IP law: the notion of minimum standards.33 Generally, 
 
exception clause, which, under Article XX(d), allows exceptions for measures 
“necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations relating to the protection 
of patents.” Id. arts. V(3), XX(d). 
 28. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
art. 51, n.13, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 29. See Council Regulation 1383/2003, supra note 6, art. 2(1). 
 30. Technically, the BMR does not use the term transit but instead refers in 
Article 1(1) to specific customs procedures defined in the E.U. Uniform Customs 
Code. See id. art. 1(1)(a) (referring to Articles 61, 37, and 183 of the E.U. Uniform 
Customs Code). 
 31. See TRIPS Agreement art. 51. 
 32. See India Consultation Request, supra note 2, at 2-3; Brazil Consultation 
Request, supra note 16, at 2-4. 
 33. The concept of minimum standards finds expression especially in Articles 
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international treaties on IP protection create a “floor,” setting a 
minimum level of protection that must be available in all national 
laws of the contracting parties without any apparent limitation as to 
the further extension of IP protection.34 This notion of minimum 
standards is a central feature in the long history of international IP 
protection whose development has primarily been a one-way route 
towards ever-increasing levels of protection.35  
However, some provisions in existing treaty law from the Berne 
and Paris Conventions as well as the TRIPS Agreement may function 
as a door-opener for maximum standards, or “ceilings,”36 to 
international IP protection. Relevant in this context, TRIPS Article 
1(1) expressly allows WTO Members to grant more extensive 
protection than what is prescribed in the Agreement but only 
 
19 and 20 of the revised Berne Convention as well as Article 19 of the Paris 
Convention. The wording of Article 20 of the Berne Convention in this regard is 
quite instructive when it requires further agreements to “grant to authors more 
extensive rights than those granted by the Convention.” See Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works arts. 19-20, Sept. 9, 1886, as 
amended on Sept. 28, 1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 [hereinafter Berne 
Convention] (emphasis added); accord Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property art. 19, Mar. 20, 1883, (as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 
1967), 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
 34. See Antony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: ‘Adequate Remuneration’ for 
Non-Voluntary Patent Licensing, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 927, 944 (2008) (noting that 
in addition to offering minimum levels of protection, TRIPS also attempts to 
control discriminatory practices ); see also Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in 
International Intellectual Property Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1028 (2007) 
(claiming that TRIPS was intentionally created to set minimum, rather than 
maximum, standards of protection). 
 35. “[O]nce rights have been inscribed into the text of an IP convention, they 
basically become sacrosanct for now and the future. Revision conferences (with 
only a few remarkable exceptions) have regularly served the purpose of further 
strengthening the position of right holders; hardly ever was an effort undertaken to 
question or curtail incumbent rules.” See Annette Kur & Henning Grosse Ruse -  
Khan, Enough is Enough The Notion of Binding Ceilings in International 
Intellectual Property Protection 8-9 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop., 
Competition & Tax Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-01, 2008), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1326429. One exception is 
the Revision of the Berne Convention 1971, where an Annex addresses the option 
for developing countries to grant compulsory licenses mainly for translation 
purposes and the proposed amendment of the TRIPS Agreement in the course of 
the Doha process. See WTO General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS 
Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter TRIPS Amendment]. 
 36. For a general analysis of this concept in international IP law, see Kur & 
Grosse Ruse - Khan, supra note 35. 
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“provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of 
this Agreement.”37 One justification for such a “ceiling” function 
comes from the incorporation of TRIPS into the WTO multilateral 
trading system: as several TRIPS provisions indicate, minimal, but 
also excessive or abusive reliance on IP protection, can distort and 
create barriers to international trade.38 Especially for border measures 
against IP infringements, the strong link to global trade and the 
traditional WTO/GATT approach towards further trade liberalization 
provide a rationale which explains binding language safeguarding the 
 
 37. In full, Article 1(1) states: “Members shall give effect to the provisions of 
this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law 
more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such 
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be 
free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this 
Agreement within their own legal system and practice.” TRIPS Agreement art. 
1(1) (emphasis added). In the June 2010 TRIPS Council meeting, the delegate of 
India emphasized the “non-contravention” requirement and pointed to maximum 
standards, or ceilings, in TRIPS that may stand against certain TRIPS-plus 
measures in national laws and in international agreements such as ACTA. See 
Intervention by India, to WTO TRIPS Council, on Agenda Item M: TRIPS-plus 
Enforcement Trends 1 (June 2009) [hereinafter TRIPS-plus Enforcement India], 
available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/ 
intervention-by-india-seizure-of-generic-drug-consignments-at-ec-ports.pdf. In the 
same vein, the delegate of China stressed that TRIPS-plus protection and 
enforcement “shall not contravene the provisions of [TRIPS].” See Intervention by 
China, to WTO TRIPS Council, on Agenda Item M: TRIPS-plus Enforcement 
Trends (June 8-9, 2009) [hereinafter TRIPS-plus Enforcement China], available at 
http://keionline.org/node/883. 
 38. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement pmbl. (emphasizing the need to “ensure that 
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves 
become barriers to legitimate trade”); id. art. 41 (stating that IP enforcement 
procedures must protect against infringement of intellectual property rights without 
blocking legitimate trade); id. art. 8(2), 40(1) (noting that measures may be 
necessary to prevent “practices which unreasonably restrain trade” and that some 
practices may adversely affect trade); see also CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE 
RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE 
TRIPS AGREEMENT 25 (2007) (suggesting that the higher the level of protection 
for intellectual property rights, the more likely the protections will create barriers 
for legitimate trade); ICTSD & UNCTAD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND 
DEVELOPMENT: AN AUTHORITATIVE AND PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT 75 (2005), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/ 
ResourceBookIndex.htm; Klaus Elfring, Allgemeine Bestimmungen und 
Grundprinzpien [General Provisions and Basic Principles], in TRIPS: 
INTERNATIONALES UND EUROPÄISCHES RECHT GEISTIGEN EIGENTUMS [TRIPS: 
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW] 79, 84 (Jan 
Busche & Peter-Tobias Stoll eds., 2007). 
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interests of traders.39 
In order to review the consistency of the TRIPS-plus elements of 
the BMR and its application to generics in transit with TRIPS, one 
therefore needs to assess which form of additional IP protection has 
the potential to “contravene” TRIPS.40 Without excluding other 
arguments for findings of contravention,41 instances where this 
qualification of TRIPS Article 1(1) applies are most likely cases 
where one can point to conflicts with a mandatory TRIPS provision 
instead of an optional one. However, mandatory rules that impose an 
obligation on states to limit IP protection are rare in international 
law.42 Instead, most limitations take the form of optional provisions, 
for example the so-called “TRIPS flexibilities,” which allow a 
country to freely decide on which grounds it allows for compulsory 
licenses to be issued in its national IP regime.43 In relation to the 
TRIPS provisions on IP enforcement, however, things are different: 
several provisions contain binding language which set out general 
principles upholding procedural guarantees for the defendant or 
preventing the creation of trade barriers as well as specific 
obligations limiting enforcement measures.44 
Since TRIPS integrates safeguards for both free trade45 and public 
health considerations,46 and balances these with its provisions on IP 
 
 39. Cf. DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS 474 (3d ed. 2008) (describing TRIPS Articles 51-60 on border measures 
as the most “trade-related” section of the TRIPS Agreement). 
 40. For a more detailed analysis of this term, see generally Henning Grosse 
Ruse - Khan, Time for a Paradigm Shift? Exploring Maximum Standards in 
International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 TRADE L. & DEV. 56 (2009). 
 41. See ICTSD & UNCTAD, supra note 38, at 24 (explaining that the pressure 
to accept TRIPS-plus standards in FTA negotiations might contravene the 
objective and purpose of the WTO Agreement and TRIPS to provide a secure 
framework for the conduct of international trade relations). 
 42. For a useful overview, see generally P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. 
OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND 
EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT 55 (2008), available at http://www.ivir.nl/ 
publications/hugenholtz/finalreport2008.pdf. 
 43. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 
2001, ¶¶ 4, 5 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
 44. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 41(1-4), 42, 43(2), 46, 47, 48(1), 50(3, 4, 6), 
52, 53, 55, 56, 58(b-c). 
 45. See id. pmbl., art. 41(1). 
 46. See id. arts. 8(1), 31bis. 
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protection under TRIPS Article 7,47 the TRIPS-plus character of the 
E.U. and Dutch measures may be inconsistent with TRIPS. One 
concrete example from the list of TRIPS provisions claimed in 
Brazil’s and India’s consultations is the idea that seizing goods 
merely in transit based on alleged IP infringements according to the 
law of the transit country may run counter to the agreement’s 
obligation to make border measures dependant on prima facie 
evidence for IP infringements based on the “law of the country of 
importation”.48 While such a finding depends on a narrow 
interpretation of the term “country of importation,” which does not 
include transit countries,49 the case provides one practical example 
where a TRIPS provision could serve as a ceiling rather than a floor 
in international IP protection. 
TRIPS Article 52 is one of the provisions Brazil alleges to be 
infringed by the seizure of generics in transit.50 This allegation may 
go even further since the TRIPS preamble expresses an aim “to 
ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property 
rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.”51 
Furthermore, Article 41(1) contains a general obligation that IP 
enforcement procedures “shall be applied in such a manner as to 
avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for 
 
 47. Id. art. 7 (“The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users 
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”). 
 48. TRIPS Agreement art. 52; see Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan & Thomas 
Jaeger, Policing Patents Worldwide? EC Border Measures Against Transiting 
Generic Drugs Under EC and WTO Intellectual Property Regimes, 40 INT’L REV. 
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 502, 533-34 (2009) (arguing that seizing goods 
in transit according to the law of the transit country is only consistent with TRIPS 
if the term “country of importation” is interpreted to include transit countries). 
 49. See id. at 534-36 (maintaining that the TRIPS agreement does not include 
countries of transit in the definition of “country of importation” because it could 
restrict countries’ access to medicines, which does not encourage social and 
economic welfare); Kumar, supra note 26, at 512-13 (concluding that 
“importation” must be read to include only the destination country in order to 
prevent measures that create barriers to legitimate trade); see also discussion infra 
Part III(B)(1) (comparing Article 7(1) of the ACTA text with Article 52 of the 
TRIPS Agreement and discussing the difference in how goods in transit are 
affected under each regulation). 
 50. See Brazil Consultation Request, supra note 16. 
 51. See TRIPS Agreement pmbl. 
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safeguards against their abuse.” India and Brazil have both also 
claimed a violation of TRIPS Article 41(1).52 A key issue here would 
be a Panel’s approach to interpreting ambiguous terms such as 
“legitimate trade” and “abuse.” If the Panel would take the TRIPS 
balancing objectives in Article 7 and its public interest principles in 
Article 8 seriously, public health and access to medicines 
considerations should play an important role.53 Indeed, all WTO 
Members—including the E.U. and its member states—emphasized in 
the Doha Declaration the importance of such an interpretation based 
on Articles 7 and 8, especially in the public health context.54 
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether India or Brazil will 
continue their challenge of the E.U. and Dutch border measures as 
TRIPS violations under the WTO dispute settlement system 
continue.55 
III. ACTA PROVISIONS ON BORDER MEASURES 
Forced by various leaks after years of secrecy,56 the negotiating 
parties to ACTA, the European Union, the United States, Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, Singapore, Morocco, 
Mexico and Switzerland, finally released an official draft text in 
April 2010.57 Subsequent to this release, the July round of 
negotiations in Lucerne, Switzerland produced a revised ACTA draft 
which again leaked in the middle of the month.58 Another ACTA 
 
 52. See India Consultation Request, supra note 2, at 3; Brazil Consultation 
Request, supra note 16, at 4. 
 53. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 7-8. 
 54. See Doha Declaration, supra note 43, ¶¶ 4-5. 
 55. Alternatively, the WTO complaint may serve as a bargaining chip—
especially for India in its FTA negotiations with the E.U. See generally India Plans 
Front to Nip New Piracy Law, THE ECON. TIMES (India), May 29, 2010, 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ economy/policy/India-plans-front-to-
nip-new-piracy-law/articleshow/5986902.cms. 
 56. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal Predecisonal/ 
Deliberative Draft, Jan 18, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft—Jan. 18, 2010], 
available at https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Full Leaked 
Text Dated January 18, 2010”). 
 57. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Public Predecisonal/ 
Deliberative Draft, Apr. 21, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010], 
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc _146029.pdf. 
 58. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal Predecisonal/ 
Deliberative Draft, July 1, 2010, [hereinafter ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010], 
available at https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow 
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draft leaked after the Washington round of negotiations in August 
2010.59 On October 2, 2010, the negotiating parties finally released a 
new consolidated text reflecting the “outcome of the 11th and final 
round of negotiations,” which is almost identical to the final ACTA 
version, which the negotiating parties made available in early 
December 2010.60 The following analysis is largely based on the 
December 2010 final text, with specific references to earlier versions 
contained in the October and April 2010 official drafts, the July text, 
and the August ACTA draft. 
In a press release after the first official release, the E.U. 
Commission emphasized that “the overall objective of ACTA is to 
address large-scale infringements of intellectual property rights 
which have a significant economic impact,” and stressed that “ACTA 
will by no means lead to a limitation of civil liberties or to 
‘harassment’ of consumers.”61 The Commission also points out that 
ACTA “will not hamper access to generic medicines.”62 A 
subsequent press release after the Lucerne round of negotiations in 
July 2010 went further, asserting that “ACTA will not hinder the 
cross-border transit of legitimate generic medicines.”63 Nevertheless, 
amongst the various concerns expressed by NGOs and academics 
about the impact of ACTA was its potential impact on the free transit 
 
“Consolidated ACTA Text, July 1, 2010”). 
 59. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal Predecisonal/ 
Deliberative Draft, Aug. 25, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010], 
available at https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Full Leaked 
Text Dated August 25, 2010”). 
 60. For the October text, see Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal 
Predecisonal/Deliberative Draft, Oct. 2, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 
2010], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/october/tradoc 
_146699.pdf. For the final ACTA text, see Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 
Dec. 3, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010], available at http://www. 
dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/Final-ACTA-text-following-legal-verification.pdf. 
 61. See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: 
European Commission Welcomes Release of Negotiation Documents (Apr. 21, 
2010), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=552 (stressing that 
ACTA will not modify IP law, but will create rules for enforcing IP rights in 
“courts, at borders, and over the internet”). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 
Report on the 9th Round of Negotiations (July 2, 2010), http://trade.ec. 
europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=588&serie=352&langld=en. 
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of goods and, hence, on international trade.64 There were allegations 
that ACTA would oblige countries to introduce border measures 
against goods in transit along the lines of the BMR, which had led to 
the highly controversial seizures of generic drugs in transit from 
India to the various developing countries discussed above.65 In 
response, the E.U., among others, stated after the release of the 
October 2010 text that “ACTA provides a balanced Agreement, 
which replies to concerns expressed by Members of the European 
Parliament, Non Governmental Organisations and other stake-
holders regarding issues such as [t]he safeguard of access to 
medicines.”66 
Now with the final round of negotiations concluded and the 
resulting final text available, does ACTA indeed mandate seizures 
against goods in transit? And does it extend to goods allegedly 
infringing patents (instead of merely applying to pirated copyright 
and counterfeit trademark goods, as is the case with TRIPS)? Before 
the October 2010 ACTA text, the relevant ACTA provisions were 
complex and often heavily bracketed, indicating that the negotiating 
parties had not reached consensus and that different options were still 
on the table.67 In the October version, however, there seems to have 
been widespread agreement over most controversial issues as only a 
few reservations of some negotiating parties remained,68 which 
 
 64. See, e.g., Text of Urgent ACTA Communique: International Experts Find 
that Pending Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Threatens Public Interests, 
AM. U. WASH. C. L. PROGRAM INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. (June 23, 2010), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique [hereinafter Urgent ACTA 
Communique] (stating that ninety academics, practitioners, and public interest 
organizations concluded that ACTA is also harmful to fundamental rights, internet 
regulation, access to medicine, IP law, international law, and democracy). 
 65. See id. 
 66. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, All You Want to Know About the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Oct. 20, 2010), http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/508&format=HTML&aged=0&lan
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en (noting that ACTA even references the Doha 
Declaration, TRIPS Article 7, and “the exclusion of patent infringements from the 
section on border control and penal enforcement.”). 
 67. See ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 59, art. 2.X; ACTA Draft—
July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.X; ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57, 
art. 2.X. 
 68. As Bridges reports, “an EU official close to the negotiations said that the 
October text was over 99 percent agreed, and that officials would be able to iron 
out remaining differences ‘through e-mail contact’ in the weeks to come. No more 
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apparently have been resolved in the December 2010 final text. In 
the following Sections A-C, the main provisions of the December 
2010 ACTA text relevant for border measures are reproduced and 
analyzed for their potential to mandate or allow seizures of generic 
drugs in transit. 
A. SCOPE OF ACTA BORDER MEASURES 
The ACTA provisions on border measures extend the existing 
minimum standards under TRIPS, which obliges WTO members to 
provide border measures only against “importation of counterfeit 
trademark or pirated copyright goods.”69 Based on the final 
December 2010 ACTA text, Section 3 contains the following main 
provision on the scope of border measures: 
Section 3: Border Measures 
ARTICLE 13: SCOPE OF THE BORDER MEASURES 
In providing, as appropriate, and consistent with its domestic system of 
intellectual property rights protection and without prejudice to the 
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement, for effective border enforcement 
of intellectual property rights, a Party should do so in a manner that does 
not discriminate unjustifiably between intellectual property rights and that 
avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate trade.70 
Further, Article 16 is decisive for determining the scope of 
obligations for border measures in ACTA: 
 
rounds of negotiations would be needed, the official said, describing the process as 
‘really at the final stage, about to cross the finishing line.’” See ICTSD, Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Pact ’99 Percent’ Complete, 14 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE 
NEWS DIG., no. 34, Oct. 6, 2010, at 1, available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/ 
bridgesweekly/bridgesweekly14-34.pdf. 
 69. See TRIPS Agreement art. 51. The border measures obligations under 
TRIPS cover easily detectable forms of copyright and trademark infringements, 
which custom authorities should be able to identify without the need for technical 
expertise. Id. art. 51, n.14. 
 70. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13. Footnote 4 to 
Article 13 states: “Where a Party has dismantled substantially all controls over 
movement of goods across its border with another Party with which it forms part of 
a customs union, it shall not be required to apply the provisions of this Section at 
that border.” Footnote 5 provides: “It is understood that there shall be no obligation 
to apply the procedures set forth in this section to goods put on the market in 
another country by or with the consent of the right holder.” Finally, footnote 6 
says: “The Parties agree that patents and protection of undisclosed information do 
not fall within the scope of this Section.” 
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ARTICLE 16: BORDER MEASURES 
1. Each Party shall adopt or maintain procedures for import and export 
shipments under which: 
(a) its customs authorities may act upon their own initiative, to suspend 
the release of suspect goods; and 
(b) where appropriate, a right holder may request its competent authorities 
to suspend the release of suspect goods. 
2. A Party may adopt and maintain procedures with respect to suspect in-
transit goods or in other situations where the goods are under Customs 
control under which: 
(a) its customs authorities may act upon their own initiative, to suspend 
the release of, or to detain, suspect goods; and 
(b) where appropriate, a right holder may request the competent 
authorities to suspend the release of, or to detain, suspect goods.71 
Together, these provisions determine the types of IP infringements 
and the trade activities for which future ACTA parties must provide 
border measures in their national laws. To determine whether ACTA 
mandates or allows seizures of generic drugs in transit, several 
aspects pertaining to the scope of border measures under ACTA are 
particularly relevant. The first subsection answers the question of 
how ACTA border measures apply to goods suspected of patent 
infringement.72 The second subsection examines how ACTA 
addresses goods in transit.73 The third subsection then looks at other 
forms of alleged infringements that might affect international trade in 
generic medicines.74 The final subsection scrutinizes the chapeau of 
ACTA Article 13 to determine which options exist so as to allow 
countries to exclude from the scope of border measures those forms 
of IP infringements which may pose a significant threat to generics 
in transit.75  
1. Patent Infringements 
The ACTA provision on the scope of border measures has been 
one of the most contentious among the negotiating parties. This 
provision concerns primarily the types of IP-infringing goods to be 
covered, but also addresses what form of trade activities fall under 
 
 71. See id. art. 16. 
 72. See discussion infra Part III(A)(1). 
 73. See discussion infra Part III(A)(2). 
 74. See discussion infra Part III(A)(3). 
 75. See discussion infra Part III(A)(4). 
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ACTA border measures. Some earlier drafts would have obliged 
contracting parties to impose border measures against goods “in 
transit” and in relation to any goods “suspected of infringing 
intellectual property rights.”76 The latter phrase was defined in the 
April ACTA draft as “goods infringing any of the intellectual 
property rights covered by TRIP,” in principle including patents.77 As 
some of the earlier leaked ACTA drafts indicate, the E.U. favored 
this approach.78 It pushed for ACTA’s provisions to be broadly 
defined so as to ensure that infringements of geographical indications 
(“GIs”) fall under its provisions.79 
 
 76. See ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57, art. 2.X:1-2. 
 77. Id. Its application to patents was, however, unclear. Article 2.X:2 continued 
by allowing to exclude certain types of IP infringements if the rights concerned 
were inter alia “[protected by [non-product- or sector-specific] [registration] sui 
generis systems].” The heavily bracketed text indicated that goods infringing 
certain (registration) sui generis rights may be excluded from the scope of ACTA’s 
border measures. The relevant question then was whether this optional exception 
would cover goods infringing patents. While patent rights under TRIPS Article 
27(1) must be granted without discrimination to the field of technology and hence 
arguably are non-product and non-sector specific, they would normally not be 
considered a sui generis system of protection. The term refers to an IP protection 
mechanism “of its own kind.” It is commonly used for rights in investment bearing 
databases outside copyright (for example, see Council Directive 96/9, arts. 7-11, 
1996 O.J. (L 77) 20, 21 (EC)) or to systems of plant variety protection outside 
patent law. See TRIPS Agreement art. 27.3(b). More recently, certain mechanisms 
to protect traditional knowledge and/or related genetic resources have been 
referred to as sui generis. See Traditional Knowledge, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). It therefore seems 
unlikely that the negotiating parties had patent rights in mind when they allowed 
excluding rights protected by certain sui generis systems. 
 78. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal Predecisional/ 
Deliberative Draft art. 2.X:2, Mar. 18, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft—Mar. 18, 
2010], available at https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/ acta (follow “Full 
Leaked Text Dated Mar. 18, 2010”). The approach chosen also strongly resembles 
Article 1 of the BMR. See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.X:1. 
 79. See EU, U.S. to Discuss Differences Over ACTA Scope in Bilateral 
Meeting, 28 INSIDE U.S. TRADE, no. 30, July 30, 2010, http://insidetrade.com/ 
Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-07/30/2010/eu-us-to-discuss-differences-over-
acta-scope-in-bilateral-meeting/menu-id-710.html (discussing the E.U.’s desire to 
broaden the scope of ACTA to protect any infringement of GIs in the same manner 
as infringements of trademarks and copyrights). This report notes that the “scope 
of the agreement is expected to be a main issue of discussion since both [the 
United States and the E.U.] have reached a deadlock on whether products with 
geographic indications (“GIs”) should be included in the agreement.” Id. See 
generally Jimmy Koo, Comparing ACTA Texts April 2010 v. July 2010, AM. U. 
WASH. C. L. PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. (Aug. 12, 2010), 
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For most commentators, however, the crucial issue was the threat 
that border measures aimed at alleged patent infringement pose to the 
free transit of medicines.80 ACTA negotiators, including the E.U., 
responded by declaring publicly that “patents will not be covered in 
the Section on Border Measures.”81 But even on the basis of the 
subsequently leaked ACTA texts, there was no clear expression that 
goods in transit allegedly infringing patent rights were to be excluded 
from the general scope of border measures under the ACTA draft.82 
In the December 2010 ACTA text reproduced above, the matter has 
finally been addressed: it clarifies that “[t]he Parties agree that 
patents and protection of undisclosed information do not fall within 
the scope of this Section.”83 This derogates from the general ACTA 
definition of the term “intellectual property” as comprising “all 
categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 
through 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement”84 and hence from the 
general obligation under ACTA Article 6(1) to foresee enforcement 
procedures against “any act of infringement of intellectual property 
rights covered by this Agreement.” It excludes patents and the 
protection of undisclosed information from the ACTA border 
measure obligations without the need to resort to the ambiguous 
provision in Article 13 and its conditions for limiting the scope of 
border measures to certain types of IP infringements.85 As a result, no 
future ACTA party will be obliged to introduce or maintain a system 
of border measures that applies to suspected patent infringing goods. 
From the perspective of international trade and access to medicines, 
 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/ go/koo08122010 (discussing the issues 
surrounding GIs as a potential deal-breaker). 
 80. See Urgent ACTA Communique, supra note 64. 
 81. See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 63. 
 82. See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.X (stating that parties 
may exclude “certain rights other than trademarks, copyrights and GIs” from the 
definition of “goods infringing an intellectual property right.”). In the ACTA draft 
that leaked after the Washington, D.C. round of negotiations, the text remains 
unchanged from the July text version. See ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra 
note 59, art. 2.X. 
 83. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13, n.6. The October 
2010 version already contained similar language stating “for the purpose of this 
Agreement, Parties agree that patents do not fall within the scope of this Section.” 
See ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 60, art. 2.X n.6. 
 84. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 5(h). 
 85. See id. art. 13; see also discussion infra Part III(A)(4) (providing a more 
detailed analysis of this provision). 
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this is certainly an improvement from earlier drafts. As the 
subsequent analysis will show, however, it is by no means a 
sufficient safeguard to ensure that transit seizures of generic 
medicines do not occur.  
While ACTA does not mandate border measures for suspected 
patent infringement, a further question is whether ACTA allows its 
future contracting parties to introduce or maintain such a system. 
This concerns not only the E.U., where the BMR covers both patents 
and transits,86 but given the dynamics of international IP law and 
policy, one must expect the trend of a continuous increase in 
protection and enforcement standards to continue.87 It is probably not 
too farfetched that in the near to medium future, some countries 
might consider ACTA standards as insufficient and strive for 
“ACTA-plus” standards in their own laws and/or in international 
agreements. The question then is whether, and to what extent, ACTA 
would allow its future contracting parties to have additional, stronger 
IP enforcement laws such as border enforcement against allegedly 
patent infringing goods. Here, the general rule in Article 2(1) of the 
December 2010 ACTA text allows “more extensive protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights than is required by this 
Agreement, provided that such protection and enforcement does not 
contravene the provisions of this Agreement.”88  
Future ACTA parties therefore can extend border measures to 
cover goods suspected of patent infringement, unless this can be 
argued to “contravene” ACTA provisions. Would such extended 
coverage amount to contravening the negotiating parties’ agreement 
expressed in Footnote 6 to the Border Measures Section that “patents 
do not fall within the scope of this Section”? This appears not to be 
the case: by agreeing to exclude inter alia patent rights from the 
section on border measures, the negotiating parties primarily wanted 
to ensure that ACTA does not contain an obligation to foresee border 
 
 86. See discussion supra Part I. 
 87. See Kur & Grosse Ruse - Khan, supra note 35, at 8-14 (explaining that 
typically, once rights have become part of a convention, they remain part of the 
convention while new rules and rights are added on top of them, strengthening 
rights and protections). 
 88. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 2(1) (emphasis added). 
This provision mirrors TRIPS Article 1(1), which is discussed in detail in Part 
II(B) above and Part IV below. 
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measures against goods suspected of patent infringements. In 
response to fears that ACTA might require seizures of generics in 
transit, negotiating parties announced that “patents will not be 
covered in the Section on Border Measures.”89 Excluding patent 
infringements from the scope of Section 3 thus means that section’s 
obligations do not apply to national border measures that extend to 
goods suspected of patent infringements. For example, the obligation 
under Article 13 that future ACTA parties should not unjustifiably 
discriminate between IP rights in defining the scope of their national 
border enforcement systems does not apply to patents.90 Hence, an 
extension to cover patent infringements is not contravening Footnote 
6 to the Border Measures Section.  
However, this conclusion does not rule out the possibility that 
extending border measures to patent infringements contravenes other 
ACTA provisions, particularly in light of some of the free trade and 
public health safeguards which ACTA negotiators borrowed from 
TRIPS to alleviate public health concerns. In this context, ACTA 
Article 6 is relevant: it is a verbatim copy of TRIPS Article 41(1) and 
serves as an important safeguard against the creation of trade barriers 
and against abusive reliance on IP enforcement measures in TRIPS.91 
While Footnote 6 prevents the application of ACTA Section 3 
obligations to patent rights, national border enforcement measures 
which address patent infringement are not immune from the general 
obligations ACTA imposes with respect to IP enforcement. For 
example, the text of Article 6(1) refers to all IP enforcement 
procedures available in national law and demands that “[t]hese 
procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation 
of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against 
their abuse.”92 Since this horizontal safeguard applies across the 
board and so affects all ACTA obligations, its operation in the 
context of transit seizures will be discussed separately in Part 
III(C)(2). 
 
 89. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 63. 
 90. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13. 
 91. See discussion supra Part II; see also discussion infra Part IV (discussing 
the trade interests in generic drugs and Article 41(1) of the TRIPS Agreement). 
 92. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6(1). 
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2. In-Transit Goods 
The second controversy regarding the scope of border measures 
under ACTA concerns the treatment of goods in transit, or in-transit 
goods as they are now defined in the December 2010 final text.93 
While ACTA Article 16 now contains a fairly clear rule, 94 earlier 
drafts indicate the range of options that had been on the table among 
the negotiating parties.95 This shows that anything beyond the 
treatment of allegedly infringing imports was equally subject to 
disagreement. Interestingly, certain combinations of a narrow scope 
(covering only “suspected counterfeit trademark goods” and 
“suspected pirated copyright goods”) and mere optional provisions 
on transits and exports would arguably have resulted in a treaty 
without a direct threat to generics in transit.96 
In Article 16 of the December 2010 ACTA text, the negotiating 
parties agreed that procedures must be available for customs 
authorities, and right holders where appropriate, to suspend the 
 
 93. This version defines “in-transit” goods as those under “customs transit,” 
defined as the “procedure under which goods are transported under customs 
control from one customs office to another,” or “transshipment,” defined as the 
“procedure under which goods are transferred from the importing means of 
transport to the exporting means of transport within the area of one customs office 
which is the office of both importation and exportation.” Id. art. 5(f), (i), (n). 
 94. See id. art. 16 (“A Party may adopt or maintain procedures with respect to 
suspect in-transit goods or in other situations where the goods are under customs 
union control.”). 
 95. See, e.g., ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57, art. 2.X (extending 
to goods “imported, exported, in-transit or in other situations where the goods are 
under customs supervision.”); see also id. art. 2.6, ¶ 1 (revealing other 
permutations of similar draft language). 
 96. Compare id. (“1. Each Party shall provide procedures for import [and in-
transit] shipments and [may] [shall] provide procedures for export shipments, by 
which right holders may request the competent authorities to suspend release of 
suspected counterfeit trademark goods and suspected pirated copyright goods 
[goods suspected of infringing an intellectual property right] into free 
circulation.”), with id. art. 2.X, ¶ 3 (“[Parties shall provide for the provisions 
related to border measures to be applied [at least ]in cases of trade mark 
counterfeiting and copyright piracy. [Parties may provide for such provisions to be 
applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual property rights.]]”). In the 
July ACTA text, however, the brackets around the term “in-transit” under Option 1 
are removed. See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.6, ¶ 1 (citing 
option 1). The July text contains a new Option 2, favored by the majority of the 
negotiating parties, which is limited to counterfeit trademark and pirated copyright 
goods, but applies to transit. Id. 
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release of “import and export shipments.”97 On the other hand, the 
second paragraph of this provision states that “[a] Party may adopt or 
maintain procedures for suspect in-transit goods or in other situations 
where the goods are under Customs control.”98 Based on the 
permissive language of these provisions, ACTA does not obligate 
contracting parties to introduce or maintain border measures against 
any form of goods in transit. This again appears to be a significant 
improvement from most of the options that were earlier on the 
table—especially from the perspective of international trade in 
generic medicines. Given that patents are completely excluded from 
ACTA’s border measure section, and measures against transits are 
merely optional rather than mandatory, one has to ask whether 
ACTA still threatens in-transit generics. Before this question is 
addressed in further detail below, the ACTA definitions pertaining to 
transits must be assessed. 
Article 5 in the December 2010 ACTA text contains three 
definitions that are relevant here. First, the definition of the term “in-
transit goods” in Article 5(i) distinguishes between two modes of 
transit: goods under “customs transit” and those under 
“transshipment.”99 According to Article 5(f), “customs transit” is 
“the customs procedure under which goods are transported under 
customs control from one customs office to another.”100 
“Transshipment” is in turn defined in Article 5(n) as “the customs 
procedure under which goods are transferred under customs control 
from the importing means of transport to the exporting means of 
transport within the area of one customs office which is the office of 
both importation and exportation.”101 The leaked ACTA draft of 
January 2010 reveals that these terms and their definitions are based 
 
 97. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 16(1)(a)-(b). 
 98. Id. art.16(2) (emphasis added). 
 99. Id. art. 5(i). The current definition of “in-transit goods” appeared first in the 
publicly released April 2010 ACTA draft text. See ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, 
supra note 57, art. 2.6, n.23 (referring to the bracketed inclusion of “in-transit” 
goods under Option 1 of draft Article 2.6). This definition of “in-transit goods” 
also appeared in the July ACTA draft text and the leaked draft text following the 
Washington, D.C. round of negotiations. See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra 
note 58, art. 2.6 (defining “in-transit” goods in footnote 18); ACTA Draft—Aug. 
25, 2010, supra note 59, art. 1.X (placing the definition of “in-transit” goods in 
Article 1.X: Definitions, located in Chapter One, Section B). 
 100. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 5(f). 
 101. Id. art. 5(n). 
2011] ACTA BORDER MEASURES 671 
on the International Convention on the Simplification and 
Harmonization of Customs Procedures (“Kyoto Convention”).102 
Until the final draft, it was questionable whether analyzing these 
terms could provide any valuable insights on the general scope of the 
notion of “transit” in ACTA, as it was not clear that all negotiating 
parties favor such technical customs definitions.103 However, the 
decision to move the definitions into a “General Definitions” section 
implies consensus amongst the negotiating parties on their relevance 
to the whole agreement.104 
The implementation of technical customs law terms in ACTA 
should be helpful to those authorities responsible for implementing 
border measures, as they should be familiar with these terms. If one 
applies the Kyoto Convention’s definitions to the case of transiting 
generics, it appears that the second alternative definition of 
“transshipment” in ACTA Article 5(n) is relevant: generic medicines 
produced in one country and in transit through another on the way to 
a third country of final destination are, after arrival in the transit 
country, “transferred under customs control from the importing 
means of transport to the exporting means of transport within the 
area of one customs office.”105 The technical customs definitions thus 
cover the typical scenarios that have led to the seizure of generics in 
transit. Nevertheless, since it is not mandatory to extend border 
measures to transits under the final December 2010 text, does ACTA 
 
 102. See ACTA Draft—Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 56, art. 2.6 n.10 (revealing 
that Canada, New Zealand, and the United States proposed the inclusion of 
“customs transit” and “transshipment” as defined by the Kyoto Convention). 
 103. It was doubtful whether all negotiating parties who used the term “in-
transit” or referred to goods in transit in more general terms—as the E.U. did in 
Art.2.X:1-2 of the April 2010 ACTA Draft—relied on the same definition of 
transit in their proposals. See, .e.g., ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57, 
art. 1.X:1-2. 
 104. See ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 59, art. 1.X. However, a 
careful reading of the October 2010 ACTA text reveals that the definitions of “in-
transit goods,” “Customs transit,” and “transshipment,” contained in Article 1.X, 
General Definitions, are not exactly the definitions used in the agreement itself. 
See ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010 supra note 60, art. 1.X. Instead, the draft language 
in Article 2.X:2 regarding Border Measures uses the phrase “goods in transit or in 
other situations where the goods are under Customs control.” Id. art. 2.X, ¶ 2 
(emphasis added). The December draft addresses the discrepancy, which was most 
likely the result of poor legal drafting, by aligning the terminology in Article 16 to 
the definitions in Article 5. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, arts. 5, 16. 
 105. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 5(n). 
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really continue to pose a significant threat for trade in generics? 
The typical juridical answer is particularly apt in this case: it 
depends. Distinct from TRIPS, ACTA explicitly allows parties to 
provide “procedures for suspect goods in transit or in other situations 
where the goods are under customs control.”106 Further, as mentioned 
above, Article 2(1) of the December 2010 ACTA text generally 
allows parties to implement more extensive protection, “provided 
that such enforcement does not contravene the provisions of this 
Agreement.”107 In relation to extending border measures to cover 
patent infringing goods, section 1 concludes that such “ACTA-plus” 
enforcement procedures may contravene the agreement’s provisions, 
particularly the safeguards against trade barriers and abuse set out in 
the “General Obligations” Section.108 The same conclusion applies to 
extending border measures to goods in transit, unless the explicit 
allowance in ACTA Article 16(2) warrants a different result.109  
One might argue that this explicit permission implies that making 
use of this right (i.e. extending border measures to cover transits) 
cannot be considered “contravening” ACTA. In principle, this is a 
logically sound argument. However, while providing enforcement 
procedures against goods in transit cannot be viewed as contravening 
ACTA norms, certain methods of doing so certainly may 
nevertheless contravene ACTA. The general obligation in ACTA 
Article 6(1) that all enforcement procedures “shall be applied in such 
a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and 
to provide for safeguards against their abuse” also applies to cases 
where ACTA explicitly allows certain measures. If a future ACTA 
party decides to make use of this allowance, it must still ensure that it 
 
 106. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 16(2). TRIPS, on the other 
hand, states: “It is understood that there shall be no obligation to apply such 
procedures to imports of goods put on the market in another country by or with the 
consent of the right holder, or to goods in transit.” TRIPS Agreement art. 51 n.13; 
see also Grosse Ruse - Khan & Jaeger, supra note 48, at 534-35 (opining that 
while this may be viewed as some form of implicit allowance to extend border 
measures to goods in transit, this view is contested); Kumar, supra note 26, at 515-
17 (discussing the conflicting scholarly interpretation of footnote 13 to TRIPS 
Article 51). 
 107. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 2(1). 
 108. Id. art. 6(1); see also discussion infra Part III(A)(3) (discussing the 
operation of Article 6(1)). 
 109. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 16(2). 
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is doing so in a way that does not create trade barriers or allow 
abuse. Hence, the option to provide border measures against goods in 
transit is subject to the general obligation to do so in a manner that 
does not create barriers to legitimate trade.110 An attempt to give a 
more concrete meaning to the ambiguous terms used in the general 
obligation provision can be found in Part III(C)(1). 
3. Other Forms of IP Infringements 
Another reason why the December 2010 ACTA text may still pose 
a threat to international trade, particularly with respect to generic 
medicines, is the fact that border measures apply not only to 
counterfeit trademark and pirated copyright goods,111 but in principle 
to all goods suspected of any other infringement of IP rights, except 
patents and the protection of undisclosed information. This follows 
from ACTA Article 6(1), which states that “[a] Party shall ensure 
that enforcement procedures are available under its law so as to 
permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual 
property rights covered by this Agreement .”112 The term “intellectual 
property” is understood as comprising “all categories of intellectual 
property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II of the 
 
 110. This may be especially relevant wherever procedures against transits are 
combined with extending the IP-infringing goods covered, such as patent 
infringing goods. The transit seizures subject to the WTO dispute brought by India 
and Brazil indicate the trade distorting potential of such extended IP enforcement 
regimes. See, e.g., India Consultation Request, supra note 2, at 2. 
 111. See TRIPS Agreement art. 51 (stating that members may adopt procedures 
to allow right holders to file claims in respect of goods “which involve other 
infringements of intellectual property rights” in conformity with the rest of the 
agreement’s provisions). Earlier ACTA drafts contained proposals which similarly 
mandated border measures “[at least] in cases of trademark counterfeiting and 
copyright piracy.” ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57, art. 2.X, (“Scope 
of the Border Measures”) ¶ 3. The July 2010 ACTA text reveals that this provision 
was the counter-proposal by the United States, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan and Canada. ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.X (“Scope of 
the Border Measures”) ¶ 3. The provision further clarified that “[p]arties may 
provide for such provisions to be applied in other cases of infringement of 
intellectual property rights.” Id. In essence, the substance of the proposed Article 
2.X:3 was identical with the scope of border measures as defined in the first 
sentence of TRIPS Article 51. See TRIPS Agreement art. 51. It therefore would not 
have obliged contracting parties to provide border measures against goods 
suspected of infringing patents, but explicitly allowed parties to do so. 
 112. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6(1) (emphasis added). 
674 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:3 
TRIPS Agreement.”113 Therefore, in general, border enforcement 
procedures must extend to infringements of any IP rights provided in 
the TRIPS Agreement. As discussed above, however, this is subject 
to the exclusion of patent and test data rights by virtue of footnote 6 
to the Border Measures Section.114 The remaining types of IP 
infringements for which future ACTA parties must provide border 
enforcement procedures thus cover, inter alia, all forms of trademark 
infringements and infringing uses of geographical indications. Such a 
broad scope of border measures permitted under ACTA had been 
highly contentious amongst the negotiating parties, particularly with 
respect to GIs.115 
While extending border measures to goods suspected of infringing 
GIs offers supporters of strong GI protection the opportunity to 
impose their law on any goods transiting through their territory,116 for 
trade in generic medicines this extension to all forms of trademark 
infringements is particularly problematic. In earlier ACTA drafts, 
this extension was explicitly addressed in a bracketed footnote, 
which provided that:  
[The provisions of this section shall also apply to confusingly similar 
trademark goods [ which means any goods, including packaging, bearing 
without authorization a trademark that is similar to the trademark validly 
registered in respect of such or similar goods where there exists a 
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public between the trademark 
borne and the trademark validly registered, and that thereby infringes the 
rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the law of the 
 
 113. Id. art. 5(h). 
 114. Discussion supra Part III(A)(1). 
 115. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR 
Releases Statement Regarding Recent ACTA Negotiations in New Zealand (Apr. 
2010), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/april/ustr-
releases-statement-regarding-recent-acta-negoti (stating that while the E.U. and 
Switzerland favor a wide scope which covers goods protected by geographical 
indications due to a perceived comparative advantage in the production and sale of 
premium food and agricultural products associated with well known regions in 
Europe, the United States and other “new world” countries desire a more limited 
scope and advocate that GIs should be excluded). 
 116. If the substantive system of protection for GIs in the transit country 
considers the mere transit as sufficient for infringement, without a threat of trade 
diversion onto the domestic market, any in-transit good that uses similar or 
identical terms may be subject to seizure. 
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country in which the procedures set out in this Section are invoked.]117 
Commentators have rightly pointed to the threat this poses to 
transiting generic medicines: by relying on the same or similar words 
identifying the active ingredient, the labels used to identify generics 
often may be to some extent similar or close to the trademarks of the 
original manufacturer.118 While a manufacturer may be expected to 
take into account the scope of trademark protection in the country of 
final destination, combining such a broad scope of border measures 
with their optional extension to goods in transit imposes another 
significant barrier to international trade. The generic producer would 
need to distinguish its labeling from all protected trademarks in all 
transit countries in order to ensure that the medicines are not seized 
in transit. This in turn will increase transaction costs and may prevent 
traders from using the most efficient transit routes. It hence adds 
further barriers to the global trade in generics and the cheap 
provision of medicines to populations in need. 
Another troubling point is that custom authorities are not well-
placed to act against “confusingly similar trademark goods” in 
general.119 Findings of likelihood of confusion based on the degree of 
similarity of both the labels and the goods require a comprehensive 
legal analysis which is much less straightforward than determining 
whether goods are counterfeit.120 Such an assessment is typically 
performed by courts or trademark offices, which have the necessary 
 
 117. ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57, art. 2.X, ¶ 2 n. 22; see also 
ACTA Draft—Mar. 18, 2010, supra note 78, art. 2.X, ¶ 2 (revealing in footnote 9 
that the extension of border measures to basically all forms of trademark 
infringements was proposed by the E.U.); ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 
58, art. 2.X, ¶ 2 (indicating support from Australia, South Korea, Switzerland, and 
Japan in footnote 16 that this provision apply to “confusingly similar trademark 
goods”). 
 118. See Sean Flynn, Note on ACTA and Access to Medicines, AM. U. WASH. C. 
L. PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP., http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/ 
go/blog-post/note-on-acta-and-access-to-medicines (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) 
(“Extending border suspensions and goods destructions to mere trademark 
infringements should be particularly worrying for generic medicines 
manufacturers.”). 
 119. See Kimberlee Weatherall, ACTA Australian Section-by-Section Analysis 
(April Public Draft), 28 (Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://works.bepress.com/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=kimweatherall (expressing a concern 
that a determination of whether a trademark is “confusingly similar” is difficult). 
 120. See id. 
676 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:3 
legal expertise, case law, and experience to rely upon. Imposing this 
task on customs officers is likely to result in a considerable increase 
in seizures and temporary detentions based on right holder 
allegations that transiting generics are confusingly similar. Until the 
generic producer or subsequent owner of the goods is able to show 
that no likelihood of confusion exists or that the goods do not pose 
any threat of being diverted into domestic markets,121 the goods will 
be detained for the time being because ACTA Article 17 allows 
initial detentions based on evidence for prima facie trademark 
infringement, judged by “the law of the Party providing the 
procedures.”122 ACTA Article 19 then requires contracting parties, 
acting through competent authorities, to initiate proceedings to 
determine the existence of an infringement “within a reasonable 
period of time.”123 Even though there is a good chance that in-transit 
generics will subsequently be found by a court not to infringe 
trademarks in the transit country,124 ACTA does not generally allow 
the goods to be released against provision of a security.125 In general, 
the goods will therefore remain detained until a court has decided on 
the infringement issue. Given the duration of court proceedings, such 
detention periods will likely pose another considerable obstacle to 
international trade in generic medicines.126 
 
 121. See discussion infra Part III(B)(2) (discussing the situation in countries 
where such a requirement in the substantive trademark law may provide a ground 
for releasing the goods due to the absence of substantive infringement). 
 122. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 17(1); see discussion infra 
Part III(B)(2) (analyzing the “choice of law” rule). 
 123. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 19. ACTA does not contain 
any provision similar to Article 55 of TRIPS which limits the initial detention 
period to 10 days. TRIPS Agreement art. 55; see also discussion infra Part 
IV(A)(3) (discussing ACTA Article 19’s consistency with the TRIPS Agreement). 
 124. See discussion infra Part III(B)(1) (discussing the decisive question of 
whether goods merely in transit are likely to be considered as infringing based on 
the law of the transit country). 
 125. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 18 (“A Party may, only 
in exceptional circumstances or pursuant to a judicial order, permit a defendant to 
post a bond or other security to obtain possession of suspect goods .”). In 
comparison, Article 53(2) of the TRIPS Agreement in turn explicitly requires that, 
for certain forms of alleged IP infringements, the owner/importer of the goods 
must have the option of posting a security in order to have the goods released. 
TRIPS Agreement art. 53; see also discussion infra Part IV(A)(3) (discussing the 
TRIPS consistency of ACTA Article 18). 
 126. See discussion infra Part III(C)(2) (discussing whether such trade barriers 
may be tackled under the new proposal in the General Obligations section of 
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Finally, another form of IP rights contained in the TRIPS 
Agreement that is related to pharmaceutical products is the 
protection of test data under Article 39(3).127 Although footnote 6 to 
the Border Measures Section generally excludes the protection of 
undisclosed information from its scope,128 the arguments above show 
that ACTA parties nevertheless may provide for enforcement 
measures against goods that are suspected of infringing their 
domestic test data protection system.129 In case they also extend their 
border measures to goods in transit, the question then arises whether 
generics may run the risk of being considered as infringing test data 
protection in the transit country. If so, this form of protection could 
be argued as functioning as a trade barrier for generics in transit. 
However, the protection of test data against unfair commercial use 
concerns data submitted to regulatory authorities in order to obtain 
marketing approval for pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical 
products—not the goods produced as a consequence of using this 
data.130 Even TRIPS-plus test data exclusivity regimes in national 
laws are highly unlikely to extend protection to generics from 
abroad: while the test data relevant to the marketing approval may be 
protected in the country of transit, generics produced elsewhere do 
not aim for marketing approval in the transit country even if the 
production occurred in reliance on this data. Hence, extending border 
measures to test data protection does not seem to pose a threat to 
international trade in generics. 
4. Options to Limit the Scope of Border Measures  
As previous sections have demonstrated, ACTA’s negotiating 
parties have tried to alleviate concerns over transit seizures and 
 
ACTA, which includes the text of TRIPS Article 41 verbatim). 
 127. See TRIPS Agreement art. 39(3) (stating that Members must protect test 
data against disclosure, unless necessary to protect the public or unless steps are 
taken to avoid unfair commercial use). 
 128. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13, n.6. 
 129. See discussion supra Part III(A)(1)-(2). 
 130. The subject matter of the protection under TRIPS is undisclosed 
information contained in written material which details the results of scientific 
health and safety testing of drugs and agrochemicals, in relation to human, animal 
and plant health, impact on the environment, and efficacy of use. TRIPS 
Agreement art. 39(3). See generally CORREA, supra note 38, at 32; G. Lee 
Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other Data Required by 
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 7 (2003). 
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access to medicines in the final December 2010 ACTA text. 
Nevertheless, some problems remain. ACTA generally allows parties 
to provide border measures against goods in transit and it requires 
future contracting parties to extend border enforcement to types of 
suspected IP infringements which carry the potential to create 
barriers to the trade in generic medicines. This raises the question of 
whether the chapeau provision in ACTA Article 13 may be utilized 
to limit this potential. It states: 
In providing, as appropriate, and consistent with its domestic system of 
intellectual property rights protection and without prejudice to the 
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement, for effective border enforcement 
of intellectual property rights, a Party should do so in a manner that does 
not discriminate unjustifiably between intellectual property rights and that 
avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate trade.131 
In particular, Article 13 might be applied to exclude those ordinary 
forms of trademark infringement that have been identified in section 
c above as tools to temporarily detain goods in transit until a court in 
the transit country has ruled on the matter. 
ACTA Article 13 has neither a ‘predecessor’ in earlier drafts, nor a 
counterpart in the TRIPS Agreement. Subject to certain conditions, 
the provision allows ACTA parties to exclude IP infringement from 
the scope of domestic border enforcement systems.132 It appears to 
primarily serve as a compromise tool bridging the differences 
between the E.U. and the United States over covering infringements 
of GIs and other IP rights beyond the minimum standards contained 
in TRIPS Article 51.133 The provision contains several open and 
ambiguous terms and conditions,134 which in sum create a form of 
 
 131. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13. 
 132. See id. (stipulating that a party can effect policies regarding border 
enforcement and IP rights so long as they are consistent with its domestic IP rights 
regime and is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement). 
 133. Compare id. art. 13 (stating that a party should promulgate border measures 
that do not “unjustifiably” discriminate), with ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010, supra 
note 60, art. 2.X (stating that a party should promulgate border measures that do 
not “unreasonably” discriminate). The fact that, in the October 2010 text version, 
the equivalent provision contained one of the very few remaining terms which 
were still disputed amongst the parties (“unreasonably” rather than the current 
“unjustifiably”) supports the view that this provision was part of a compromise 
between the United States and the E.U. 
 134. Ambiguous terms in Article 13 include “discriminate unjustifiably,” “as 
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constructive ambiguity that disguises the remaining differences 
amongst the parties over the treaty text.135 Instead, each party will be 
able justify its own understanding by relying on a favorable 
interpretation of one or more of these terms. While this constructive 
ambiguity may have been primarily created to allow the negotiating 
parties to take different approaches to address infringements of 
geographical indications, it may equally serve as an appropriate tool 
to exclude ordinary trademark infringements from a national system 
of border measures. 
The basic obligation which Article 13 repeats is to provide “for 
effective border enforcement of intellectual property rights,”136 
subject to several requirements. For instance, a Party’s acts must be 
“consistent with [its] domestic system of intellectual property rights 
protection” and “without prejudice to the requirements of the TRIPS 
Agreement.”137 The first phrase clarifies that enforcement measures 
apply only insofar as the ACTA party’s domestic system of 
substantive IP protection considers the goods potentially 
infringing.138 Hence, for ordinary trademark infringements, border 
measures must, in principle, be available. The second phrase ensures 
that future ACTA parties are bound by the minimum standards of 
border enforcement prescribed in the TRIPS Agreement.139 It equally 
 
appropriate,” “legitimate trade,” “and “consistent with a parties domestic system of 
intellectual property rights protection.” ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, 
art. 13. 
 135. See Henning M. Grosse Ruse - Khan, The Role of Chairman’s Statements 
in the WTO, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 475, 491-92 (2007) (positing that “constructive 
ambiguity” allowed all sides to come to an agreement at the cost of specificity). 
 136. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13. This basic obligation is 
already contained in Article 6. See id. art. 6(1) (“Each Party shall ensure that 
enforcement procedures are available under its law so as to permit effective action 
against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this 
Agreement”); see also discussion supra Part (II)(A)(3). 
 137. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13. 
 138. See discussion infra Part III(B)(2) (discussing the relationship of ACTA 
with domestic IP protection laws). Compare ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra 
note 60, art. 13 (“In providing, as appropriate, and consistent with its domestic 
system of intellectual property rights protection .”), with id. art. 3(1) (“This 
Agreement shall be without prejudice to provisions in a Party’s law governing the 
availability, acquisition, scope, and maintenance of intellectual property rights.”). 
 139. See id. art. 13. In applying this provision, for example, a future party may 
not, exclude border measures against counterfeit trademark and pirated copyright 
goods as demanded by TRIPS Article 51 when introducing limits to the types of IP 
infringements covered. 
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upholds all minimum requirements that safeguard the interests of 
traders and owners of the goods potentially subject to border 
measures.140 This condition does not prevent future parties from 
excluding ordinary trademark infringements from its border IP 
enforcement system as long as counterfeit trademark goods are still 
covered, as defined in footnote 13 to TRIPS Article 51. 
The main discretionary element of Article 13, then, is that a party 
can provide for such effective border measures “as appropriate.” 
Within the boundaries mentioned above, this seems to offer ample 
flexibility to limit the types of infringements covered.141 This 
discretion is further limited only slightly by the call that parties 
“should do so in a manner that does not discriminate unjustifiably 
between intellectual property rights and that avoids the creation of 
barriers to legitimate trade.”142 Here, the use of the permissive 
“should” instead of the mandatory “shall” is a decisive factor in that 
it does not create a new obligation under international law.143 The 
second element concerning the avoidance of trade barriers would 
actually militate in favor of limiting border measures in a way that 
does not threaten trade in generic medicines.144 Under the first 
element, unjustifiable discrimination should be avoided but 
justifiable distinctions between types of infringements where good 
faith reasons validate a different treatment are certainly allowed. 
Here, access to medicines and international trade in generic 
medicines and other goods can serve as justifications to exclude 
 
 140. Id. In application, this provision would uphold TRIPS Articles 41, 55, and 
56. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 41, 53, 55, 56; see also discussion infra Part 
IV(A)(3) (discussing potential conflicts between ACTA and the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
 141. The notion of effectiveness does not preclude such findings. In the 
preamble to the TRIPS Agreement, the negotiating parties expressed their intention 
“[to provide] effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related 
intellectual property rights, taking into account differences in their respective legal 
systems and practices.” ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, pmbl. 
(emphasis added). This strongly indicates that the notion of effectiveness must 
nevertheless give deference to variances among the national enforcement systems. 
 142. See id. art. 13. 
 143. See GERVAIS, supra note 39, at 203 (discussing the use of the word 
“should” in TRIPS Article 7 and stating that it should not be viewed as reducing 
the scope of “shall”). 
 144. See discussion infra Part III(C)(2) (analyzing TRIPS Article 41(1)). TRIPS 
Article 41(1) is the equivalent provision of Article 13 in ACTA, even though the 
former is phrased as a “shall” obligation. 
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ordinary trademark infringements, especially if the country has 
introduced border measures against goods in transit. The chapeau 
provision in ACTA Article 13 therefore allows for the exclusion of 
those types of infringements from a domestic system of border 
measures that are particularly problematic for generic drugs in 
transit. The general obligation to create such measures for ordinary 
trademark infringements is therefore also waived so long as such 
exclusion can be justified on public health grounds.  
In sum, the scope of the ACTA border measures section allows 
parties to prevent the seizure of generic medicines. However, 
countries have to implement the agreement with all of these options 
in mind in order to take public health issues into account.  
B. APPLICABLE LAW AND DETERMINATION OF INFRINGEMENT 
This section assesses two related general aspects of the December 
2010 ACTA text that may affect international trade in generics. The 
border measures section in ACTA contains rules on the applicable 
law governing the determination of the IP-infringing character of 
goods subject to border measures. Section 1 below contrasts the 
relevant ACTA provision with that of the TRIPS Agreement and 
highlights its impact on international trade in generics. Furthermore, 
ACTA, as an agreement on the enforcement of IP rights, claims not 
to set its own standards of IP protection and does not prescribe which 
acts contracting parties shall treat as infringements of their national 
laws. It contains a general rule, however, on the relationship between 
the applicable national IP infringement standards and the IP 
enforcement obligations under ACTA. Section 2 examines the 
operation of this rule for cases of generics in transit. 
1. The Applicable Law in IP Border Enforcement Cases 
In principle, a system for the enforcement of IP rights such as 
border measures is a system of procedural law as distinguished from 
substantive law. However, the international character of global trade 
and its natural connection to the territories and markets of several 
countries makes it useful, if not necessary, to include a rule on which 
a nation’s substantive law shall apply. The applicable law then 
primarily determines whether the goods in question infringe on IP 
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rights.145 As the Dutch transit seizure cases have shown, the national 
laws of the country of production, of transit, and of destination 
certainly may have different answers here.146 A choice of law rule 
that decides which substantive law is relevant will therefore be 
crucial for determining the existence of an IP infringement. 
Under TRIPS, the choice of law rule obliges WTO Members to 
require from right holders applying for the seizure of goods 
“adequate evidence to satisfy the competent authorities that, under 
the laws of the country of importation, there is prima facie an 
infringement of the right holder’s intellectual property right.”147 
Thus, the relevant law determining whether the goods in question are 
prima facie infringing is that of the country of importation.148 This 
choice is arguably driven by two considerations. First, since TRIPS 
merely obliges WTO members to provide border measures against 
imports, the authorities and courts charged to rule on the infringing 
nature of goods will likely be those of the importing country. Of 
course, applying one’s own law to judge IP infringements will make 
things much easier. In principle, however, the application of a 
foreign law is always a possible alternative, both under general 
doctrines of private international law as well as under the generally 
accepted choice of law rule for IP rights.149 Second, since the goods 
 
 145. See discussion infra Part III(B)(2) (discussing the problem of determining 
infringement and establishing the role of the scope of the applicable substantive IP 
law). 
 146. See discussion supra Part I (discussing the seizure by the Dutch of generic 
drugs in transit and the conflict among several substantive IP regimes). 
 147. See TRIPS Agreement art. 52. 
 148. Id. In addition, TRIPS refers to the law of the importing country to 
determine goods that contain counterfeit trademarks or copyright piracy. See id. 
art. 51 n.14. 
 149. One common theory in private international law calls for the application of 
the law of the country which has the strongest territorial link or connection to the 
legal issue to be decided. Other theories examine all potentially applicable norms 
and ask which has the strongest and most valid interest to be applied (government 
interest analysis). In both instances, this may be a foreign territory and a foreign 
rule. The application of the principle of lex loci protectionis to determine the law 
applicable to the protection of a certain subject matter by IP rights can also lead to 
the application of a foreign law as soon as IP protection for a foreign territory is 
sought. Article 5(2) of the Revised Berne Convention on the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works confirms this for the area of copyright law by determining that 
‘‘the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to 
protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where 
protection is claimed.’’ Berne Convention, supra note 33, art. 5(2) (emphasis 
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are to be sold or otherwise commercialized on the market of the 
importing country, understood as the country of final destination,150 
there is generally a strong link to that country, justifying the 
application of its law.151  
The December 2010 ACTA text contains a provision equivalent to 
TRIPS Article 52, which states: 
Each Party shall provide that its competent authorities shall require a right 
holder that requests the procedures described in subparagraphs 1(b) and 
2(b) of Article 16 (Border Measures) to provide adequate evidence to 
satisfy the competent authorities that, under the law of the Party providing 
the procedures, there is prima facie an infringement of the right holder’s 
intellectual property right.152 
Despite its similarly to TRIPS, the applicable law rule is different 
in ACTA: instead of the country of importation, the relevant 
benchmark for judging whether goods are IP-infringing is “the law of 
the Party providing the procedures,”153 meaning the domestic IP law 
 
added). For the question of applicable law in the context of private international 
law, this rule is frequently cited to justify the application of the law of the country 
where an act conflicts with IP rights granted by the domestic law and on this basis 
protection is sought (lex loci protections). For the area of patent law, one can refer 
to Article 4bis (1) of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property: 
‘‘Patents applied for in the various countries of the Union by national of countries 
of the Union shall be independent of patents obtained for the same invention in 
other countries, whether members of the Union or not.’’ Paris Convention, supra 
note 33, art. 4(1); see CORREA, supra note 38, at 81 (expressing that this principle 
of independence of patents builds on and presupposes the principle of 
territoriality). 
 150. See Kumar, supra note 26, at 510-17 (discussing the relation of the term 
“country of importation” in the context of other relevant articles of TRIPS); Grosse 
Ruse - Khan & Jaeger, supra note 48, at 534-36 (interpreting the meaning of the 
term “country of importation”). 
 151. Kumar, supra note 26, at 512-17 (indicating that other provisions in TRIPS 
suggest that an essential element of importation into a country is the likelihood and 
possibility of the goods entering the channels of commerce in [the] country.). 
 152. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 17(1). 
 153. The definitions of “counterfeit trademark goods” and “pirated copyright 
goods” in the definitions section of ACTA further confirm this applicable law rule. 
See id. art. 5(d), (k) (stating that whether goods are counterfeit or pirated is to be 
judged “under the law of the country in which the procedures set forth in Chapter 
II (Legal Framework for Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights) are 
invoked.”). These differ in the same aspect from the otherwise identical provisions 
in footnote 14 to TRIPS Article 51. TRIPS Agreement art. 51 n.14 (announcing 
only that counterfeit or pirated goods are to be judged under the law of the country 
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of the authorities adopting the border measures. For measures taken 
against imported goods, nothing changes: they are still judged by the 
law of the importing country since the relevant authorities are those 
of the importing country. For goods in transit, however, the 
applicable law is no longer that of the country of importation or final 
destination, but instead that of the country where the goods are 
seized by customs in transit, namely the transit country.154 
As the Dutch transit seizure cases illustrate, this change in the 
choice of law rule can have severe consequences.155 In those cases, 
the law of the transit country was applied to determine whether the 
drugs in transit are IP-infringing even though there was no IP 
infringement in the countries of origin and production or the 
countries of importation and final destination.156 Although some have 
argued otherwise,157 this rule is, at least formally, consistent with the 
notion that IP rights are territorial in nature.158 A broad definition of 
 
of importation). 
 154. See Grosse Ruse - Khan & Jaeger, supra note 48, at 534-36 (addressing the 
question of whether the TRIPS Agreement takes a more specific approach by 
defining the “laws of the country of importation” as applying only to the country of 
final destination); discussion infra Part IV(B) (discussing whether the transit 
country rule is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement). 
 155. See discussion supra Part I (describing how the Dutch seizure of generic 
medicines to treat hypertension and HIV/AIDS, among other diseases, prevented 
the medicines from reaching their destination in developing countries in South 
America and Africa). 
 156. See discussion supra Part II(B) (explaining that Dutch authorities seized the 
generic medicines under E.U. and Dutch border measures, a choice of law rule 
which arguably contradicts the TRIPS approach of making border measures 
dependent on evidence of IP infringements based on the law of the country of 
importation). 
 157. See, e.g., India Consultation Request, supra note 2, ¶ 3 (reading the TRIPS 
Agreement and Doha Declaration to mean that “the rights conferred on the owner 
of a patent cannot be extended to interfere with the freedom of transit of generic 
drugs lawfully manufactured within, and exported from, India”); Frederick M. 
Abbott, Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based on Allegations of 
Patent Infringement: A Threat to International Trade, Development and Public 
Welfare, 1 WIPO J. 43, 49 (2009) (arguing that the decision of the E.U. to apply 
European laws to goods in transit constitutes a denial of “the sovereign rights of 
foreign WTO Members” to grant their own patents). 
 158. See L. BENTLY & B. SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 929 (2d ed. 
2004) (stating that under the principle of territoriality, the existence and scope of 
IP protection in relation to acts committed on domestic territory depends on the 
domestic law); CHRISTOPHER ARUP, THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
AGREEMENTS: GLOBALIZING LAW THROUGH SERVICES AND INTELLECTUAL 
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territoriality may allow minimal territorial linkages, such as the 
transit of goods through a country, to be treated as a sufficient 
expression of territoriality by the law of the transit country. Thus, 
such minimal territorial connections can be used as the relevant 
connecting factor for a choice of law rule, even though the goods 
may have a much stronger connection to the territory of another 
country, for example, the country in which the goods will be sold or 
otherwise commercialized.159 Notwithstanding the consistency of the 
choice of law rule with the territorial nature of IP laws, the existence 
of these comparably stronger territorial linkages have sparked many 
scholars to criticize laws with a minimal link as “extraterritorial” in 
reach.160 
 
PROPERTY 30 (2000); INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY TREATIES 3 (Alfredo Ilardi & Michael Blakeney eds., 2004) (explaining 
that while international IP law heavily influences domestic legislation, global IP 
rights are nevertheless “a bundle of nationally enforceable rights”); Paul 
Katzenberger & Annette Kur, TRIPS and Intellectual Property, in 18 IIC STUDIES 
IN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW: FROM GATT TO TRIPS 1, 3-5 
(Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996) (asserting that the domestic 
nature of the protection of IP rights effectively constitutes a non-tariff restriction 
on trade and illustrating how this type of restriction operates in the context of 
pirated goods). But see Annette Kur, A New Framework for Intellectual Property 
Rights Horizontal Issues, 35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1, 7 
(2004) (discussing the “erosion of the territoriality principle” in light of the global 
dimension of IP rights, and calling for the development of new mechanisms to 
resolve cross-border IP disputes). 
 159. Unless international harmonization via multilateral treaties on conflict of 
law rules has circumscribed national autonomy to determine which connecting 
factors trigger the applicable law, countries enjoy freedom to decide how to define 
the notion of territoriality and the necessary linkages of conducts or persons to its 
territory. 
 160. See Abbott, supra note 15 (noting that transit of goods through EU airports 
“involves minimal jurisdictional contract with EU territory,” and arguing that “[i]t 
is an extreme concept of trade regulation to suggest that goods in transit must 
comply with ordinary local regulatory requirements in order to avoid confiscation 
by local customs authorities”); see also Josef Drexl, Lex Americana ante portas 
Zur Extraterritorialen Anwendung nationalen [Lex Americana ante portas The 
Extraterritorial Application of National Law], in URHEBERRECHT IM 
INFORMATIONSZEITALTER [COPYRIGHT IN THE INFORMATION AGE] 429 (Ulrich 
Loewenheim ed., 1999); Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan, A Pirate of the Caribbean? 
The Attractions of Suspending TRIPS Obligations, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 313, 349-
50 (2008) (discussing the recent trend in the extraterritorial application of domestic 
IP laws by countries that “fear insufficient IP protection for the intellectual assets 
of their companies abroad” in lieu of working towards harmonization of IP laws 
through international agreements). 
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For generics in transit, the applicable law rule in ACTA allows the 
transit country to apply its own law to determine whether goods in 
transit infringe on IP rights. While not all transit countries may 
consider the mere transit of goods as IP infringing,161 the applicable 
law rule nonetheless creates uncertainty and legal insecurity for all 
international trade in goods: the owners and traders in generic 
medicines now have to consider the choice of law rules and 
substantive laws of all transit countries in order to find out whether it 
is “safe” to use a specific transit route. 
2. Determination of Infringement 
Given ACTA’s applicable law rule, the question arises how to 
determine an infringement of IP rights under ACTA. In this regard, 
the December 2010 ACTA text provides: 
ARTICLE 19: DETERMINATION AS TO INFRINGEMENT 
Each Party shall adopt or maintain procedures by which its competent 
authorities may determine, within a reasonable period of time after the 
initiation of the procedures described under Article 16 (Border Measures), 
whether the suspect goods infringe an intellectual property right.162 
Whether one of the remedies specified in ACTA is available first 
depends on the finding that the goods are infringing in accordance 
with the procedures adopted pursuant to Article 19.163 However, as a 
treaty concerned with the enforcement of IP rights, ACTA does not 
set its own substantive standards in regards to the infringement of IP 
rights.164 Instead, Article 3(2) provides the general rule on the 
 
 161. See discussion infra Part III(B)(2) (elaborating on the determination of 
infringement). 
 162. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 19 (emphasis added). 
 163. Id. art. 20(1), (3) (providing that competent authorities may destroy goods 
or impose administrative penalties “following a determination referred to in Article 
19 that the goods are infringing”) (emphasis added). 
 164. Id. art. 3(1) (confirming that ACTA’s provisions shall not be understood as 
setting new or distinct standards of substantive IP protection, other than those 
available under the domestic laws of future ACTA parties). Apart from specific 
instances in which ACTA enforcement obligations arguably set de facto new 
standards of substantive IP enforcement, for example, regarding copyright 
protection on the internet, this is a crucial difference between ACTA and the 
TRIPS Agreement. In the latter, the general obligation in IP enforcement requires 
“that enforcement procedures are available so as to permit effective action against 
any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement.” 
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relationship between the procedural rules mandated under ACTA and 
the substantive standards of IP protection under which states 
determine infringements—“[ACTA] does not create any obligation 
on a Party to apply measures where a right in intellectual property is 
not protected under its laws and regulations.”165 The decisive 
question of whether goods are IP infringing thus depends on the 
substantive IP protection standards in domestic law.166 In situations 
where no substantive IP protection exists according to domestic law, 
there is per se no obligation to establish IP enforcement measures. 
Put another way, ACTA does not require contracting parties to 
enforce border measures against goods that do not infringe domestic 
IP rights. Countries that do not consider transit as an act infringing a 
patent, trademark, or copyright protected under their national IP 
systems would therefore not be obliged to seize these goods, even if 
their systems of IP border enforcement would generally extend to 
patent infringements as well as goods in transit.167  
Thus, the final fate of allegedly infringing goods in transit depends 
on whether the substantive scope of IP protection in the transit 
country actually covers transit as an infringing act. In other words, 
would the domestic IP law consider acts with a marginal territorial 
link to the transit country as infringements or does it demand a real 
and proven threat of trade diversion in the market of the transit 
country? A recent decision of the English Court of Appeals raised 
precisely this question, analyzing whether the BMR encompasses 
 
TRIPS Agreement art. 41(1) (emphasis added). The verbatim copying of this 
provision into ACTA Article 6(1) is apparently the result of poor legal drafting 
since this provision is directly contradicted by Article 3. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 
2010, supra note 60, arts. 3, 6(1).  
 165. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 3(2). The development of 
Article 3(2) is traceable to the April 21, 2010 draft. See ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 
2010, supra note 57, art. 2.X n.21 (Scope of the Border Measures) (“No Party shall 
be obliged to apply this section to any goods that do not infringe an intellectual 
property right held within the territory of that Party. [Negotiator’s note: Study 
moving to General Provisions section.]”). 
 166. As the previous section has shown, it is the law of the contracting party that 
governs the applicable procedures. The question discussed in this section is related, 
but a distinct one since it deals with the scope of ACTA and whether it sets out 
new standards of IP infringement. 
 167. One can further argue that this follows as a general rule also from the 
requirement for prima facie evidence for an “infringement of the right holder’s 
intellectual property right.” ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 17(1) 
(emphasis added). 
688 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:3 
goods in transit.168 On this question, the European Court of Justice 
(“ECJ”) has previously held that trademark ownership in the country 
of transit did not justify interference with the transit procedure unless 
the “goods are subject to the act of a third party while they are placed 
under the external transit procedure which necessarily entails their 
being put on the market in the Member State of transit.”169 The ECJ 
also clarified that the risk of deviance to the transit market must be 
manifest, stating specifically that the possibility that “they could 
theoretically be marketed fraudulently” is insufficient to support the 
trademark owner’s application under the BMR.170 In sum, the right-
holder must offer concrete evidence for a substantiated threat of trade 
diversion in order to show the infringement of trademarks in the 
transit country (which in turn triggers the application of border 
measures).171  
 Other ACTA parties, however, may certainly take a different 
position here. Often the substantive scope of protection will vary 
according to type of IP right in question: while a country may 
demand a concrete threat of trade diversion for trademark 
infringement, it may consider any form of transit sufficient for the 
infringement of other IP rights, or may not view any transiting goods 
as potentially infringing in other cases. For generic drugs in transit, 
the availability of potential remedies, such as seizure and destruction 
of goods under ACTA,172 depends on whether, and under what 
conditions, the domestic IP law of the country providing the border 
measures considers transits as potentially infringing. On one hand, 
this seems to reduce the risk for border measure remedies against 
transiting generics as patent or trademark infringing goods since few 
countries are likely to apply such a broad notion of protection for an 
 
 168. Case C-495/09, Nokia Corp. v. HM Comm’rs of Revenue & Customs, 
2010 O.J. (C 37) 22, 22; Nokia Corp. v. HM Comm’rs of Revenue & Customs, 
[2009] EWHC (Ch) 1903 (Eng.). 
 169. Case C-281/05, Montex Holdings Ltd v. Diesel SpA, 2006 E.C.R. I-10897, 
¶ 23. The ECJ made similar judgments in other cases. See, e.g., Case C-405/03, 
Class Int’l BV v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 2005 E.C.R. I-8761, ¶ 50; Case C-
383/98, Polo/Lauren Co. v. PT. Dwidua Langgeng Pratama Int’l Freight 
Forwarders, 2000 E.C.R. I-2531, ¶ 34. 
 170. Montex Holdings Ltd, 2006 E.C.R. ¶ 24. 
 171. For a detailed discussion of the ECJ’s case law in the context of E.U. 
seizures of generics in transit, see Grosse Ruse - Khan & Jaeger, supra note 48, at 
510-19. 
 172. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 20. 
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IP right to transit cases that lack any real link to their territory. On 
the other hand, under ACTA, authorities in the transit country may 
detain generics merely “suspected” of infringing domestic IP rights 
until a court decision on that question has been issued.173 This is 
because ACTA allows right holders to request the suspension of 
goods if they can provide prima facie evidence of infringements of 
their rights.174 Until customs have clarified whether an alleged threat 
of trade diversion really exists, goods are unlikely to be released.175 
Moreover, if the right-holder and the owner of the goods dispute the 
facts underlying the case for trade diversion, the goods may not be 
released until the matter has been resolved in a court.176 The E.U. and 
Dutch seizures demonstrate the likelihood of such scenarios arising. 
Even if goods are released after a certain period of time, this 
temporary detention poses a significant obstacle to free transit and 
the international trade in generic medicines. This result further 
introduces great legal insecurity and uncertainty for traders and users 
of generic medicines. In sum, ACTA Article 3(2) does not provide 
sufficient safeguards against seizures of generics in transit. 
C. ACTA SAFEGUARDS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND AGAINST TRADE 
BARRIERS  
Sections III(A) and (B) above have analyzed the potential threat 
that the ACTA border measures pose for international trade for 
generics in transit in particular. While negotiators have taken some 
important steps to address the matter, the December 2010 ACTA text 
still seems to allow seizures of goods in transit suspected of 
“ordinary” trademark infringement in the transit country. This 
section now examines the efficacy of relevant safeguards 
incorporated into the December 2010 ACTA text. Do the mandated 
border measures prevent trade barriers and protect public health 
 
 173. See id. arts. 16, 19. Article 19 specifies that this determination must be 
made within a “reasonable period.” Earlier drafts contained specific maximum 
periods for initial detentions until determination of infringement. See, e.g., ACTA 
Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.6, ¶ 3 (showing that the negotiating 
parties favored a maximum detention period of one year, with the exception of 
Singapore, who favored a maximum period of sixty days). 
 174. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 17(1). 
 175. Note, however, that detained goods may be released against posting of a 
bond or other security. Id. art. 18. 
 176. Id. art. 19. 
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concerns? In particular, do the safeguards prevent seizures of 
generics in transit from (re-)occurring?  
1. Interpretation Based on TRIPS Articles 7 and 8  
The July draft text of ACTA offers opportunities for a public 
interest focused interpretation of the ACTA treaty terms.177 Initially, 
the text of Article 1.X was a verbatim copy of Articles 7 and 8 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, provisions that have been identified as key 
TRIPS flexibilities affecting the interpretation and implementation of 
all TRIPS provisions.178 Then, in the August 2010 ACTA draft, the 
newly inserted preamble contained a verbatim copy of the TRIPS 
text in brackets and also provided that the contracting parties are 
“[d]etermined to implement this Agreement in a manner consistent 
with the objectives and principles set out in the TRIPS Agreement 
.”179  
Now, the final December 2010 ACTA text provides: “The 
objectives and principles set forth in Part I of the TRIPS Agreement, 
in particular in Articles 7 and 8 shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to this 
Agreement.”180 In addition, in the relevant part of the December 2010 
text of the ACTA preamble the negotiating parties agree to ACTA: 
 
 
 177. See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 1.X (text proposed by 
Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Canada) (stating that IP rights should be 
enforced in a manner consistent with “the promotion of technological innovation,” 
and that parties may “adopt measures necessary to protect public health and 
nutrition” and other sectors in the public interest). But see id. art. 1.X, ¶ 3 
(revealing that Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and the United States requested the 
deletion of language regarding the abuse of IP rights while the E.U. wished to 
incorporate the principles of the provision into the ACTA preamble). 
 178. See generally Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan, Proportionality and Balancing 
Within the Objectives for Intellectual Property Protection, in 18 INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 161, 185 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2008) (noting 
that “one of the TRIPS flexibilities is the right of individual WTO Members to 
interpret TRIPS in light of its purpose” as expressed in Articles 7 and 8); Peter K. 
Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 
1018-46 (2009) (discussing the ways in which Articles 7 and 8 guide interpretation 
of the TRIPS Agreement, can also be used to challenge the aggressive expansion 
and enforcement of IP rights, and spark development of new international IP 
norms). 
 179. ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 59, pmbl. 
 180. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 2(3). 
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Recognizing the principles set out in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, adopted on November 14, 2001, by the WTO at 
the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, held in Doha, Qatar;181  
 
The TRIPS provisions incorporated in ACTA state: 
Article 7 Objectives 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers 
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social 
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
Article 8 Principles 
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, 
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided that such measures 
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.  
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of 
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology.182 
Against the background of their interpretative role,183 the question 
arises whether the incorporation of these provisions by reference can 
have the same impact on ACTA treaty interpretation. One way to 
shed light on this question is by analyzing an ACTA provision that, 
if interpreted widely, may be pertinent in the context of transit 
seizures. In relevant part, Article 18 states that “a Party may, only in 
exceptional circumstances or pursuant to a judicial order, permit a 
defendant to post a bond or other security to obtain possession of 
suspect goods.”184 The question then is what would constitute 
 
 181. Id. pmbl. 
 182. TRIPS Agreement arts. 7-8. 
 183. For a general discussion on the role of Article 7 and 8 in TRIPS, see 
Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan, A Comparative Analysis of Policy Space in WTO 
Law 2 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop., Competition & Tax Law Research 
Paper Series, Paper No. 08-02, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1309526. 
 184. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 18 (emphasis added). The 
provision stems from a bracketed footnote in an earlier draft stating that “where the 
competent authorities suspend the release of suspected counterfeit trademark or 
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“exceptional circumstances?” Could this provision function as a 
public health safeguard that allows the release of generics in transit 
against posting of a security, for example, if the traders or recipients 
of the medicines can make a case for a good faith public health use 
of the drugs? 
On one hand, in the likely event that the term “exceptional 
circumstances” is interpreted narrowly, this would only allow for a 
marginal scope of application in general. On the other hand, an 
interpretation based on TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 may lead to different 
results. Therefore, the central question hence is whether the 
incorporation of these TRIPS provisions can perform a similar 
interpretative function in ACTA. In that case, any open and 
ambiguous terms in ACTA, including “exceptional circumstances,” 
would have to be interpreted in light of the balancing objectives and 
public interest principles expressed in the TRIPS provisions. Such an 
interpretation then can assume the existence of exceptional 
circumstances whenever public health and access to medicines 
concerns speak for the release of goods in transit, even if they are IP 
infringing in the transit country.185 
As mentioned above, ACTA’s negotiating parties recognized the 
principles set out in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health in the preamble to the December draft,186 which provides a 
strong argument that these principles should control interpretation of 
ACTA provisions. The Doha Declaration indicates that TRIPS 
 
pirated copyright goods, the authorities shall not permit the goods to be released 
into free circulation, exported, or subject to other customs procedures, except in 
exceptional circumstances.” ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57, n.24. 
The July ACTA text reveals that United States and Japan were the main supporters 
of this provision. ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, n.19. In the ACTA 
draft that leaked after the Washington, D.C. round of negotiations, the language 
was moved to the provision dealing with remedies. ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, 
supra note 59, art. 2.11. The next iteration of the provision appeared in what would 
be close to its final form. ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 60, art. 2.9. 
 185. A similar result may be obtained by a public health motivated interpretation 
of the term “due cause.” ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 17(4). 
That provision concerns certain options to deny right holder applications for 
seizures of allegedly infringing goods and states “a Party may provide that, where 
the applicant has abused the process, or where there is due cause, its competent 
authorities have the authority to deny, suspend, or void an application.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 186. See id. pmbl. 
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should be interpreted and implemented “in a manner supportive of 
WTO members’ right to protect public health.”187 WTO members 
recognized that the expressed “objectives and principles” guide 
interpretation of the Agreement, in accordance with “customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law.”188 The recognition of 
these principles of treaty interpretation in ACTA, therefore, indicates 
that the drafters intended to give TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 the same 
interpretative weight as WTO members agreed to in the Doha 
Declaration.  
Further support for such a result comes from the customary rules 
of treaty interpretation in international law. Under the general rules 
of treaty interpretation embodied in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), a treaty’s object and purpose is one main 
element for understanding its provisions.189 ACTA does not contain a 
provision explicitly entitled “Objectives;” therefore, ACTA’s object 
and purpose is arguably defined through ACTA’s incorporation of 
TRIPS Articles 7 and 8. In other words, the balancing objectives and 
public interest principles embodied in Articles 7 and 8 function as 
the main objectives of ACTA, which strongly support a broad 
interpretation of the term “exceptional circumstances” oriented 
towards public health.  
Another aspect of the principles on treaty interpretation offers 
additional arguments for taking public health perspectives into 
account. The VCLT provides that treaty interpretation may also be 
guided by any relevant international law that applies to the parties.190 
This could be a basis for taking access to medicine considerations 
into account, flowing from the right to health as embodied in the 
 
 187. Doha Declaration, supra note 43, ¶ 4. 
 188. Id. ¶ 5(a). 
 189. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]; see also Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan, A Real 
Partnership for Development? Sustainable Development as Treaty Objective in 
European Economic Partnership Agreements and Beyond, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
139, 163-66 (2010) (explaining the role of “object and purpose” when interpreting 
treaties in international economic law). 
 190. VCLT, supra note 189, art. 31(3)(c); see also Campbell McLachlan, The 
Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention, 
54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 279, 280 (2005) (proposing that Article 31(3)(c) expresses 
a value of “systemic integration” in international law). 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.191 
Such an “integrative” interpretation, however, should be seen as a 
safeguard of last resort.192 Here, the incorporation of Articles 7 and 8 
of the TRIPS Agreement offer sufficient means to take public health 
considerations into account when interpreting open and ambiguous 
ACTA terms such as “exceptional circumstances.”193 
The example therefore proves the point that the same balancing 
objectives and public interest principles which guide treaty 
interpretation in relation to the TRIPS Agreement apply in the ACTA 
context. At the same time, treaty interpretation is equally affected by 
the ordinary meaning and the context of the treaty provision at 
issue.194 While TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 play a role, for most of the 
concrete ACTA obligations with concise treaty language, the 
ordinary meaning of the terms in their context will be the starting 
point and primary elements for interpretation.195 Still, there are other 
provisions not discussed here which contain open and ambiguous 
treaty terms such as “legitimate trade” and “proportionality.”196 The 
interpretation of those provisions, like “exceptional circumstances,” 
 
 191. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, 
Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 192. See Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan, Policy Space for Domestic Public 
Interest Measures Under TRIPS (South Centre Research Paper No. 22, 2009), 
available at http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view 
=article&id=1039%3Apolicy-space-for-domestic-public-interest-measures-under-
trips&Itemid=248&lang=en (explaining the integrative approach as it applies to 
TRIPS and the Doha Declaration). 
 193. Nevertheless, the exceptional character of the release option in Article 18 
limits its potential role in the context of transiting generics. Traders and recipients 
of generics would depend on the willingness of customs and courts to rely on this 
exception. Contracting parties might also take different positions here so that, 
again, security and predictability in international trade with generics suffers. In 
sum, even if this exception is applied in the context of transiting generics, it is 
unlikely to provide a solution that serves as comprehensive safeguard against 
seizures such as those by Dutch authorities. 
 194. See VCLT, supra note 189, art. 31(1); see generally Grosse Ruse - Khan, 
supra note 178, at 162-81 (applying VCLT rules of treaty interpretation to TRIPS 
Articles 7 and 8) 
 195. See, e.g., Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/189, reprinted in 1966 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 169, 220, 221 [hereinafter 
Int’l Law Comm’n Rep] (stressing a “textual approach” where the “starting point 
of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation 
ab initio into the intentions of the parties”). 
 196. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6(1), (3). 
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will be ripe for guidance from ACTA’s object and purpose, which is 
arguably embodied in TRIPS Articles 7 and 8. 
2. Obligation to Avoid the Creation of Barriers to Legitimate Trade 
Since the July 2010 draft, the ACTA text contains a new provision 
that may function as an additional safeguard against the use of IP 
enforcement procedures as barriers to trade and against abusive 
reliance on such procedures.197 In the final December 2010 ACTA 
version, the relevant text provides:  
ARTICLE 6: GENERAL OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
ENFORCEMENT 
1. Each Party shall ensure that enforcement procedures are available 
under its law so as to permit effective action against any act of 
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, 
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies 
which constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These procedures 
shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to 
legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.198 
As indicated above, the new provision is a verbatim copy of 
TRIPS Article 41(1).199 The second sentence builds on similar 
language in ACTA’s preamble,200 and in Article 13.201 The provision 
 
 197. See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.X, ¶ 1 (General 
Obligations with Respect to Enforcement). In the July ACTA text, the whole 
provision, which stemmed from a U.S. proposal, is still in brackets. See id. n.8. 
The ACTA draft that leaked after the subsequent Washington, D.C. round of 
negotiations, however, does not contain any brackets or other indications of dissent 
amongst the negotiating parties. See ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 59, 
art. 2.X, ¶ 1 (General Obligations with Respect to Enforcement). While there have 
been changes in the other paragraphs of the provision on General Obligations, this 
text remained the same in the subsequent October draft. ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 
2010, supra note 60, art. 2.X, ¶ 1. 
 198. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6. 
 199. See discussion supra Part III(A)(1)-(2). 
 200. Compare ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, pmbl. (“Desiring to 
ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not 
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.”), with TRIPS Agreement pmbl. 
(“Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking 
into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual 
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.”). 
 201. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13 (“In providing for 
effective border enforcement of intellectual property rights, a Party should do so in 
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contains a binding obligation, horizontally applicable to all 
enforcement measures under ACTA. It can be particularly relevant 
for border measures under ACTA and their potential to mandate 
seizures of generic medicines and other goods in transit in light of 
the language “shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the 
creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards 
against their abuse.”202 Since this provision contains a binding 
prohibition against applying enforcement procedures as to create 
barriers to legitimate trade, it is not surprising that India and Brazil 
claim that the E.U. transit seizures violate the TRIPS Article 41(1) 
version of this provision.203 
In order to assess the operation of the new Article 6(1) of ACTA 
in relation to the ACTA provisions which may mandate or allow 
transit seizures, the decisive question is when the detention and 
seizure of goods in transit amounts to “barriers to legitimate trade.” 
Such detentions and seizures arguably create barriers to international 
trade by temporarily preventing the free movement of goods in 
transit via detention in the transit country, and, when goods are 
permanently seized and subsequently destroyed, by inhibiting the 
free movement of goods from the country of origin towards the 
country of destination. Under WTO law, the principle of freedom of 
transit stipulates that “[t]here shall be freedom of transit through the 
territory of each contracting party, via the routes most convenient for 
international transit, for traffic in transit to or from the territory of 
other contracting parties.”204 A contextual interpretation of the term 
“barriers to legitimate trade” in TRIPS Article 41(1) thus arguably 
includes measures that inhibit the international transit of goods as a 
central element to global trade. ACTA Article 6(1) is a verbatim 
copy of this TRIPS provision and should be interpreted identically 
given that all ACTA negotiating parties are WTO members, and that, 
presumably, the negotiating parties want to introduce provisions 
consistent with WTO law, especially the TRIPS Agreement.205 
 
a manner that avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate trade.”); see also 
discussion supra Part III(A)(4) (analyzing the elements of Article 13). 
 202. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6(1). But see id. art. 13 
(providing that ACTA parties “should,” rather than “shall,” enforce border 
measures in a manner that “avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate trade”). 
 203. See supra Part II. 
 204. GATT art. 5(2). 
 205. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 1 (emphasizing that 
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Whereas detentions and seizures of goods in transit are creating 
barriers to international trade, difficulties arise especially in relation 
to the interpretation of the term “legitimate trade.” For example, how 
does one determine the legitimacy of the trade inhibited or prevented 
by the operation of IP enforcement procedures—in this case border 
measures against goods in transit? In order to address this question it 
is useful to first look at the understanding of the identical term in 
TRIPS Article 41(1). 
In the WTO/TRIPS context, so far no Panel or Appellate Body 
report has addressed the interpretation of the relevant part of TRIPS 
Article 41(1).206 However, the term “legitimate” as part of the phrase 
“legitimate interests”207 has been interpreted by a WTO Panel. In 
Canada-Pharmaceutical Products, a WTO Panel defined 
“legitimate” as “a normative claim calling for protection of interests 
that are ‘justifiable’ in the sense that they are supported by relevant 
public policies or other social norms.”208 Determining legitimacy 
therefore requires a normative assessment of the relevant action, 
conduct, or measure based on justifiable public interests and policies. 
Such a normative approach finds support in the literature, which 
views TRIPS Article 41(1) as an expression of the need for balancing 
the interest of title-holders, alleged infringers, and the public 
interest.209  
Based on this reasoning, “legitimate trade” under TRIPS Article 
41(1) means any trade for which a justifiable public policy or interest 
exists or which is supported by other social norms. Thus, trade in 
generic drugs is legitimate because of the public policy of promoting 
cheaper access to medicines and the interest in promoting public 
 
ACTA respects obligations under existing agreements, “including the TRIPS 
Agreement”). 
 206. See generally WTO Analytical Index: TRIPS, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/trips_e.htm#article4
1 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 207. See TRIPS Agreement art. 30 (“Members may provide limited exceptions 
to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not 
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account 
of the legitimate interests of third parties.”) (emphasis added). 
 208. Panel Report, Canada Patent Protections of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 
7.69, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada Panel Report]. 
 209. See, e.g., ICTSD & UNCTAD, supra note 38, at 581. 
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health. In comparison, trade in fake drugs, which contain the wrong 
dosage of active ingredients, is not legitimate because no interest is 
served in promoting access to ineffective or dangerous drugs. Under 
such a normative assessment, the barriers to trade created by seizing 
and detaining generic drugs in transit are arguably barriers to 
legitimate trade and thus inconsistent with TRIPS Article 41(1). 
In addition to the normative approach, legitimacy can also be 
understood in a positivist sense to mean anything authorized by 
law.210 Under such a legalistic approach, any trade which is in 
conformity with the law is legitimate trade. Determining legality is 
the obvious problem with this approach, in particular, which body of 
law should control.211 For the interpretation of “legitimate” in TRIPS 
Article 41(1), WTO law is the primary source of guidance, including 
the substantive standards of IP protection in the TRIPS Agreement. 
The international obligations in TRIPS, however, would not provide 
a sufficient answer since internationally traded goods may be 
infringing the TRIPS-mandated IP protection in one WTO Member 
country but not in another. Based on the concept of territoriality, 
these goods may be non-infringing in the country of origin and 
destination, but maybe infringing in the country of transit. It is 
precisely this scenario that led to the current dispute over transit 
seizures between the European Union, India, and Brazil. The 
territorial nature of IP rights (and hence of IP legality) is what makes 
such a determination of legitimacy inconclusive and somewhat 
meaningless. Since ACTA does not affect the fundamental territorial 
nature of IP rights, a positivist understanding of the term legitimacy 
in Article 6(1) is equally unavailing.  
The above arguments speak for a normative, rather than positivist, 
understanding of “legitimate trade” under ACTA Article 6(1). Thus, 
 
 210. Canada Panel Report, supra note 208, ¶ 7.68 (noting the ordinary meaning 
of the term is “conformable to, sanctioned or authorized by, law or principle” or 
“[n]ormal, regular, conformable to a recognized type”);. see also Panel Report, 
United States Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, ¶ 6.224, WT/DS160/R (June 
15, 2000) (recognizing a positivist definition of legitimacy). 
 211. One option is that international rules, notably international trade and IP 
treaty rules, determine legality. Another option is that domestic law determines 
legality. The latter approach raises a second question: which domestic law? 
Applying the laws of the countries of origin, transit, and destination may produce 
variable results. See infra Part III(B)(1) (discussing applicable law in IP border 
enforcement cases in light of the principle of territoriality). 
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any enforcement procedures that create barriers to trade for which a 
justifiable public policy exists or which are supported by other social 
norms would be considered as “barriers to legitimate trade.” The 
only question remaining is what type of public policy or social norms 
are relevant? Although ACTA does not contain a comprehensive set 
of normative values which could guide the understanding of 
legitimacy, the reference to TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 as discussed 
above indicate that, inter alia, public health concerns must be taken 
into account in the interpretation of ACTA provisions.212 This finds 
further support in the preamble to ACTA, which references “the 
principles set out in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health.”213 This confirms that public health concerns are 
relevant social norms in determining the legitimacy of trade under a 
normative framework. 
A more difficult question is which normative considerations and 
public policies are decisive, those of the country of production, the 
country of transit, or the country of final destination? Here, the 
specific free trade rationale of Article 6(1) comes into play.214 If 
safeguarding free trade is indeed the rationale for Article 6(1), then 
requiring cumulative normative legitimacy based on the public 
interests and social norms in all countries involved is too narrow of 
an approach. To explain, there may be instances where trade would 
not be considered legitimate simply because one country does not 
recognize the normative considerations held by others. This would be 
problematic if the non-recognizing country is one which has minimal 
 
 212. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 2(3) (“The objectives 
and principles set forth in Part I of the TRIPS Agreement, in particular in Articles 
7 and 8 shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to this Agreement.”); see also discussion 
supra Part III(C)(1) (arguing that Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement supply 
the object and purpose of ACTA by reference). 
 213. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, pmbl. Under the Doha 
Declaration, supra note 43, ¶ 5 (a), the importance of the object and purpose of a 
treaty, as embodied in TRIPS Agreement arts. 7-8, is highlighted as a principle of 
treaty interpretation which guides the understanding of all TRIPS provisions. 
Recognizing this principle in ACTA means that Article 7 and 8 TRIPS—
incorporated into ACTA by reference in Article 2(3)—equally guide the 
interpretation of all ACTA provisions. For further details, see discussion supra 
Part III(A)(1). 
 214. This is supported by the preamble to ACTA which also expresses the 
intention of the negotiating parties to avoid the creation of trade barriers. ACTA 
Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, pmbl. 
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territorial link to the goods traded. In light of the international and 
cross-border nature of trade, justifiable public interests and social 
norms may originate from any country directly affected by the trade 
and would certainly include the country of origin and the country of 
destination. Whether the public policy concerns of the country of 
transit are equally relevant, however, should depend on whether the 
traded goods have a substantial connection to the transit country.215 
This would mean that seizures of goods in transit amount to the 
creation of barriers to legitimate trade whenever the trade in these 
goods can be justified primarily by a public policy in the country of 
origin or the country of destination. 
Such a result, however, must be examined for consistency with the 
specific border measure provisions in ACTA. In order to achieve an 
overall coherent interpretation, the understanding of different 
provisions within the same agreement cannot conflict.216 In other 
words, the operation of the prohibition to create barriers to legitimate 
trade cannot be understood in a way which prohibits border measures 
against goods in transit that ACTA explicitly allows or even 
mandates. If ACTA would have included a binding obligation to 
introduce border measures against IP infringing goods in transit, 
there would be little room left for arguing that national seizures of 
allegedly patent infringing generics in transit per se violate the free 
trade safeguard in Article 6(1). Since the border measure obligations 
in the final December 2010 ACTA text exclude patents; since they 
allow but do not mandate enforcement against goods in transit; and 
since they further can be limited to certain types of IP infringements 
under Article 13 on the scope of border measures (such as trademark 
 
 215. Similar to questions of the applicable law in private international law, a 
substantial connection test could ask whether, for example, the threat of trade 
diversion onto the domestic market or other factors establish a sufficient 
connection to the territory of the transit country which justifies the application of 
that country’s normative values to affect the determination of “legitimate trade.” 
For a similar argument that generics in transit constitute legitimate trade when 
there is no threat of diversion onto the domestic market of the transit country, see 
also Kumar, supra note 26, at 513. 
 216. This follows from the principle of good faith in treaty interpretation (as 
embodied in the VCLT, supra note 189, art. 31 (1)) which is, inter alia, an 
expression of the principle of pacta sunt servanda that in turn embodies the 
principle of effectiveness. See Int’l Law Comm’n Rep., supra note 195, at 221; IAN 
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 119-120 (2d ed. 
1984). 
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counterfeiting and copyright piracy),217 there is more room for 
applying Article 6(1). As discussed above, the right to introduce 
additional enforcement measures is limited by contravening ACTA 
provisions.218 Thus, the prohibition to create barriers to legitimate 
trade can still function to limit “ACTA-plus” border measures. Not 
even the explicit allowance to extend border measures to goods in 
transit is immune from this general obligation in Article 6(1). If an 
ACTA party decides to make use of this allowance, it must still 
ensure that it is doing so in a way which does not create trade 
barriers.219 
If this insight is applied to the understanding of “legitimate trade” 
advocated here, ACTA Article 6(1) will prohibit seizures of goods in 
transit as a barrier to legitimate trade whenever the trade in these 
goods can be justified by a public policy in the country of origin or 
the country of destination. Since the transit and trade in generic drugs 
will almost always be justified by public health concerns in the 
country of destination, any ACTA contracting party must ensure that 
its system of border measures does not create barriers to such trade. 
The best option for doing so is to exclude transit from the scope of 
the domestic border IP enforcement system altogether. If, however, a 
country chooses to extend border measures to transits, it must 
comply with Article 6(1) and ensure that the free transit of generics 
is not affected. This can be done by addressing the main threat to 
generics in transit, namely by eliminating border measures against 
ordinary forms of trademark infringements.220 Other mechanisms 
may also be an option—such as the applicable law approach in the 
Swiss border measure system, which requires that goods in transit 
infringe both Swiss IP law and the law of the country of 
destination.221  
 
 217. See discussion supra Part III(A)(1)-(4). 
 218. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 2(1); see also 
discussion supra Part III(A)(2). 
 219. Cf. discussion supra Part III(A)(2). 
 220. See discussion supra Part III(A)(3). 
 221. For a general explanation on the Swiss approach to border enforcement, see 
Ab 1. Juli 2008 in der Schweiz mit neuer rechtlicher Grundlage gegan Fälschung 
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An alternative to border measures against goods in transit is 
enforcement in the country of destination. The December 2010 
ACTA text is devoid of this alternative, though earlier ACTA drafts 
contained a provision to this effect.222 While alternative enforcement 
in the country of destination would seem to address the problem of 
seizures in the transit country, the operation of such a provision 
would have a rather limited effect because it would apply only in 
cases where exports or transits are destined to another ACTA 
party.223 Further, it remains doubtful that any provision similar to the 
proposed Article 2.X offers enforcement in the country of destination 
as a reliable alternative. Instead, the proposal seemed to refer only to 
situations where an ACTA party requests such information in a 
specific instance of transit or export.224 It therefore does not allow 
generally excluding right holder applications or ex officio measures a 
priori for cases of exportation and transit. Nevertheless, the general 
idea of enforcement in the country of final destination as an 
alternative to border measures against goods in transit may be 
another option to pursue further.225 It certainly would not have 
 
 222. One draft stated: 
[As an alternative to procedures in Article 2.6.1 and 2.7.1 relating to export or in-
transit shipments, each Party shall provide that where shipments are exported from that 
Party, or shipments are in-transit through that Party, it shall cooperate to provide all 
available information to the destination Party, upon request of the destination Party, to 
enable effective enforcement against shipments of infringing goods.] 
ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57, art. 2.X (preceding art. 2.9). In the 
subsequent July and August ACTA drafts, the provision appeared in slightly 
modified forms and was supported only by Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. 
See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.X (preceding art. 2.9); ACTA 
Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 59, art. 2.X (preceding article 2.9). 
 223. Given that in most seizure cases the transiting generics were destined for 
developing countries, which are not currently negotiating parties of ACTA and are 
unlikely to accede to ACTA in the foreseeable future, enforcement in these 
destination countries would not be an option under the draft Article 2.X. 
 224. Alternatively, the proposed Article 2.X may be understood that in cases of 
exports and transits, countries are allowed to waive obligations under Articles 2.6.1 
and 2.7.1 (now Article 16) if they “provide all available information to the 
destination Party, upon request of the destination Party, to enable effective 
enforcement against shipments of infringing goods.” But such a reading hinges on 
a wide interpretation of “as an alternative to procedures in Articles 2.6.1 and 
2.7.1.” Id. 
 225. For this to be a viable alternative to border measures for goods in transit, 
options for communication and cooperation between the relevant authorities in 
transit and destination country must be improved, especially in relation to goods 
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equivalent potential to create barriers to legitimate trade. 
In sum, ACTA Article 6(1) prohibits ACTA parties from applying 
their border measures in a way that creates barriers to the trade in 
generics. Especially when these countries go beyond ACTA to 
extend border measures to goods in transit, they are under an 
international obligation to ensure that their domestic border 
enforcement systems allow the free transit of generics. In addition, 
other ACTA provisions, such as those on civil enforcement regarding 
injunctive relief and damages, must be implemented in a way that 
does not affect legitimate trade in generics.226 Article 6(1) therefore 
functions as a horizontal safeguard against trade barriers and IP 
enforcement abuse.  
IV. ACTA VERSUS PUBLIC HEALTH AND FREE 
TRADE SAFEGUARDS UNDER TRIPS 
In a joint statement shortly before the first public release of the 
ACTA draft in April 2010, the negotiating parties declared: “ACTA 
will not interfere with a signatory’s ability to respect its citizens’ 
fundamental rights and liberties, and will be consistent with the 
TRIPS Agreement and will respect the Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health.”227 As mentioned above, a subsequent press release 
after the Lucerne round of negotiations in July 2010 went further, 
asserting that “ACTA will not hinder the cross-border transit of 
legitimate generic medicines,” and assuring that “patents will not be 
covered in the Section on Border Measures.”228 
This analysis, however, calls into question the consistency of 
certain ACTA provisions with the TRIPS Agreement. As Part III 
demonstrates, the most recent ACTA text still allows seizures of 
 
which the transit country considers as being IP infringing on their face. 
 226. In this manner, ACTA Article 6(1) can also be applied to address concerns 
over the impact other IP enforcement obligations, such as those concerning 
injunctions, may have on the transit of generic medicines. For an overview of other 
concerns related to ACTA, see Concerns raised over ACTA at TRIPS Council, 
THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/ 
intellectual_property/info.service/2010/ipr.info.101102.htm. 
 227. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Joint Statement on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) (Apr. 16, 2010), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases 
Action.do?reference=IP/10/437. 
 228. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 63. 
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generics in transit based on alleged patent or trademark 
infringements in the transit country. And in some instances, the 
ACTA rules only allow the release of generics after a considerable 
period of detention.229 In other cases, ACTA mandates their 
destruction.230 While some ACTA provisions, in particular the 
general obligation under Article 6(1), can be applied to limit the 
negative impact of ACTA rules to transiting generics, no provision 
explicitly prohibits transit seizures. Instead, Article 6(1)’s function to 
safeguard trade in generics hinges on the correct interpretation of 
ambiguous and open treaty terms like “legitimate trade.”231 
Part II pointed to several TRIPS provisions that may constrain the 
ability of WTO members to extend border measures to allegedly 
patent infringing goods in transit. In their consultation requests, India 
and Brazil also relied on TRIPS provisions, which they argue are 
infringed by the Dutch transit seizures. They are thereby invoking 
TRIPS as an agreement that contains a ceiling on the introduction of 
additional IP protection measures.232 As a benchmark constraining 
additional protection beyond TRIPS under certain conditions, TRIPS 
may also affect the ability of WTO Members, under international 
law, to negotiate obligations for such additional protection in ACTA 
provisions.233 This section looks at the potential for TRIPS to legally 
constrain the TRIPS-plus options under ACTA. The section focuses 
on certain ACTA provisions that have the potential to conflict with 
TRIPS, and on the general international law parameters that may be 
invoked to resolve any conflicts between TRIPS and ACTA. 
 
 229. The goods suspected of IP infringement will in principle be released only 
once a court or other relevant authority has decided on the infringing character of 
the goods. See ACTA Draft Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 19. 
 230. Once goods are found to IP infringing, the principle remedy is the 
destruction or disposal outside the channels of commerce. See id. art. 20(1). 
 231. See discussion supra Part III(C)(2). 
 232. See India Consultation Request, supra note 2; Brazil Consultation Request, 
supra note 16. 
 233. In a response to Members of the European Parliament demanding a WTO 
inquiry into ACTA, the WTO Director General Pascal Lamy noted that while 
TRIPS does not preclude its members from introducing additional measures to 
protect IP rights, as the negotiating parties to ACTA are doing, such protection 
cannot contravene TRIPS provisions. See Letter from Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., 
World Trade Org., to EU Parliament Members (May 4, 2010), available at 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/WTO-Lamy_Answer-to-MEP-letter.pdf. 
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A. THE CONFLICT POTENTIAL BETWEEN TRIPS AND ACTA 
The tension, if not direct conflict, between TRIPS and TRIPS-plus 
free trade agreements (“FTAs”) as well as ACTA are evident in the 
perceptions of WTO Members. For example, the Indian and Chinese 
delegates expressed such concerns in the TRIPS Council Meeting on 
June 8-9, 2010.234 On the relation between TRIPS and TRIPS-plus 
FTAs such as ACTA the Indian delegate stated: 
Although TRIPS Agreement is usually considered to be a minimum levels 
agreement, enforcement levels cannot be raised to the extent that they 
contravene TRIPS Agreement. TRIPS plus measures cannot be justified 
on the basis of Art 1:1 since the same provision also states that more 
extensive protection may only be granted “provided that such protection 
does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement”. In addition to 
laying certain minimum standards, TRIPS Agreement also provides 
‘ceilings’, some of which are mandatory and clearly specified in the 
TRIPS Agreement.235 
The delegate further emphasized the potential effects of the 
additional enforcement obligations in ACTA on the TRIPS 
Agreement: “In view of the recent seizures of generic drug 
consignments, [ACTA] provisions relating to ‘in-transit’ in all 
likelihood would create barriers to access to essential generic 
medicines, as well as access to critical climate change 
technologies.”236 
Similarly, the Chinese delegate stressed that while TRIPS 
generally establishes “only minimum standards of IP protection,” it 
also constrains the ability of WTO Members to foresee more 
extensive protection by requiring, inter alia, that “such protection 
shall not contravene the provisions of this agreement.”237 These 
views were shared by delegates from Peru, South Africa, Egypt, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and other developing countries.238 At the 
subsequent TRIPS Council Meeting, China threatened to pursue 
 
 234. ICTSD, Animated TRIPS Council Meeting Tackles Public Health, ACTA, 
Biodiversity, 14 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., June 16, 2010, available at 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/78201/. 
 235. TRIPS-plus Enforcement India, supra note 37. 
 236. Id. 
 237. TRIPS-plus Enforcement China, supra note 37 (quoting Article 1(1) of 
TRIPS). 
 238. ICTSD, supra note 234. 
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dispute settlement in the WTO as a result of “any negative spill-over 
effects” from ACTA.239 China argued that ACTA should be 
evaluated to determine whether it is consistent and compatible with 
the existing WTO legal framework, whether it impinges on the rights 
of WTO members, and whether it creates additional obligations for 
WTO members.240  
Given many countries’ concerns about conflicts between TRIPS 
and subsequent TRIPS-plus FTAs, the conflict potential between 
TRIPS and ACTA, in relation to border measures against goods in 
transit, must be critically assessed. Specifically, a potential conflict 
exists between TRIPS provisions that integrate public health 
concerns and free trade aspects and ACTA rules allowing seizures of 
transiting generics. As discussed in Part II, examples of TRIPS 
provisions that such seizures may violate include Articles 41(1) and 
52.241 Other norms may also be relevant, especially from the border 
measures section which contains binding safeguards for the interests 
of traders.242 Any meaningful analysis here depends on the exact 
wording of the final ACTA provisions and their application to 
transiting generics. While such a scrutiny was premature in relation 
to the earlier, still heavily bracketed ACTA drafts, the December 
2010 ACTA text contains the outcome of the final round of 
negotiations. The following thus offers an overview of ACTA 
provisions potentially conflicting with TRIPS, and sets out some 
guidelines for understanding the relevant ACTA and TRIPS 
provisions in a mutually consistent manner. In order to frame the 
discussion on what constitutes a conflict between TRIPS and ACTA, 
the subsections briefly survey the instances in which ACTA border 
measures extend beyond TRIPS standards.243 
 
 239. See China Slams Nearly Completed ACTA, Questions its WTO 
Compatibility, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 2, 2010, http://insidetrade.com/ 
201011022343572/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/china-slams-nearly-completed-
acta-questions-its-wto-compatibility/menu-id-173.html. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Recall that, under TRIPS, additional IP protection may not contravene 
TRIPS provisions. See TRIPS Agreement art. 1(1). 
 242. Id. arts. 53.1, 2; 55; 56, 58(b). For an in-depth analysis of these sections, 
see also Grosse Ruse - Khan & Jaeger, supra note 48. 
 243. ACTA may directly conflict with TRIPS so that compliance with both 
agreements is impossible, or ACTA provisions may indirectly undermine the 
exercise of a right under TRIPS, such as a TRIPS flexibility. See discussion infra 
Part IV(B). 
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1. Scope of Border Measures 
While TRIPS requires border measures only against the 
importation of counterfeit trademark goods or pirated copyright 
goods,244 in principle, future ACTA parties must provide border 
enforcement against imports and exports of goods infringing any IP 
right covered in TRIPS, with the exception of patent rights.245 
The rather ambiguous provision on the scope of border measures 
offers ways to limit enforcement to certain IP infringements if done 
“in a manner that does not discriminate unjustifiably between 
intellectual property rights and that avoids the creation of barriers to 
legitimate trade.”246 For example, based on the arguments above, it 
can be applied to exclude ordinary trademark infringements from the 
scope of border measures.  
Further, ACTA requires ex officio actions in relation to imports 
and exports,247 whereas TRIPS merely allows ex officio measures if 
certain conditions are fulfilled.248 Finally, like TRIPS, ACTA allows 
the extension of border measures to goods in transit.249  
In sum, the scope of ACTA border measures differs from TRIPS 
in that more types of IP infringements and exports must be included. 
TRIPS allows the extension of border measures to other IP 
infringements and to goods in transit, provided the parties adhere to 
the relevant safeguards for traders and good owners.250 In the ACTA 
context, where extension of border measures to goods in transit is 
also allowed, the crucial question becomes whether these safeguards 
are properly integrated into the ACTA framework. 
 
 244. See TRIPS Agreement art. 51. These terms are further defined in Article 
51, note 14. 
 245. See discussion supra Part III(A)(1)-(3). 
 246. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13. 
 247. Id. art. 16(1). 
 248. TRIPS Agreement art. 58. 
 249. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 16(2). 
 250. TRIPS Articles 1(1) and 51 allow these forms of TRIPS-plus protection if 
the further requirements of the TRIPS border measure section are met (such as 
those in Articles 52-55) and in so far as these forms do not contravene TRIPS 
provisions. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 1(1), 51; see also Grosse Ruse - Khan & 
Jaeger, supra note 48, at 524. 
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2. Applicable Law 
While TRIPS requires adequate evidence of infringement “under 
the laws of the country of importation,”251 ACTA demands such 
evidence based on the “laws of the Party providing the 
procedures.”252 For imported goods subject to border measures, the 
two rules both lead to the law of the importing country being 
decisive for showing prima facie infringement. 
For transit cases, the assessment of IP infringement must now be 
based on the law of the transit country.253 Here, ACTA takes a 
different position than TRIPS. Whether this difference actually 
amounts to “facial conflict with the WTO TRIPS Agreement,”254 
however, depends on the notion of conflict in international law and 
possible ways to reconcile the diverging provisions.255 
3. Safeguards for Traders and Goods Owners 
ACTA creates more opportunities for right holders to provide 
securities,256 but unlike TRIPS, it does not mandate the release of 
goods upon provision of a security by the “owner, importer, or 
consignee.”257 Instead, under ACTA, goods owners, importers, or 
other defendants may only provide securities to obtain possession of 
the goods “in exceptional circumstances or pursuant to judicial 
 
 251. TRIPS Agreement art. 52. 
 252. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 17(1). 
 253. This question of applicable law, however, does not prejudice the question 
of whether that country’s substantive IP law actually considers transit of the goods 
as an act of infringement. See id. art. 3(2); see also discussion supra Part III(B). 
 254. Sean Flynn, Amend ACTA: Defining Terms by Country of Importation, AM. 
U. WASH. C.. L. PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. (Sept. 9, 2010), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/amend-acta-defining-terms-by-
country-of-importation. 
 255. See discussion infra Part IV(B). 
 256. In addition to the options provided in TRIPS, see TRIPS Agreement art. 
53(1), ACTA contains an additional option which allows rights holders to provide 
the security “in the form of a bond conditioned to hold the defendant harmless 
from any loss or damage resulting from any suspension of the release of, or 
detention of, the goods in the event the competent authorities determine that the 
goods are not infringing.” See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 18. 
 257. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 53(2), 55 (providing for the release of goods 
after ten days of detention upon “the posting of a security in an amount sufficient 
to protect the right holder for any infringement”). 
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order.”258  
Further, while TRIPS has an indemnification provision to protect 
importers and owners of goods in the event of wrongful detention of 
goods,259 ACTA has no equivalent provision, other than the general 
obligation to provide fair and equitable procedures and to provide 
“appropriate” protection for “the rights of all participants subject to 
procedures.”260  
Third, TRIPS contains mandatory limits on the duration of the 
initial detention of goods suspected of infringement.261 Although 
ACTA does not contain an equivalent rule, the general obligation to 
protect the rights of all participants to the procedures in an 
appropriate manner may have the same effect.262  
Finally, ACTA grants rights to obtain information to right holders 
which go beyond those in TRIPS.263 These rights however are subject 
to a general privacy safeguard.264 
4. Implementing the Article 31(f) TRIPS Waiver 
It has been argued that an effective implementation of the TRIPS 
“paragraph six mechanism”265 could also be at risk whenever 
 
 258. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 18. 
 259. See TRIPS Agreement art. 56. 
 260. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6(2). As an extended 
version of TRIPS Article 41(2), ACTA Article 6(2) arguably covers the specific 
rights of traders foreseen under TRIPS Article 56, even though ACTA does not 
explicitly mention indemnification. 
 261. See TRIPS Agreement art. 55 (providing that proceedings must be initiated, 
or the goods released, within ten days with a possible extension of another ten days 
“in appropriate cases”). 
 262. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6(2). 
 263. Compare id. art. 22, with TRIPS Agreement art. 57. 
 264. Article 22 begins with the chapeau clause—“[w]ithout prejudice to a 
Party’s laws pertaining to the privacy or confidentiality of information”—
indicating that such laws may override the specific duties to provide authorities 
with powers to disclose information. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, 
art. 22. 
 265. For similar allegations in the European Union Transit case, see WTO 
General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 ( Sept. 2, 2003) and TRIPS 
Amendment, supra note 35. The “paragraph six mechanism,” so termed due to its 
original mandate in the Doha Declaration, see Doha Declaration, supra note 43, ¶ 
6, which this General Council decision implements, allows exports of medicines 
produced under a compulsory license into countries with insufficient 
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medication produced under a compulsory license for export to a 
country with insufficient manufacturing capacity transits through 
ports of ACTA parties.266 Also, in this scenario the ACTA provisions 
relevant for border measures against generics in transit offer no 
explicit safeguard against seizures solely based on transit 
jurisdiction: depending on the scope of IP infringements covered by 
domestic border measures of future ACTA parties, any medication 
that is patent or trademark protected in domestic law could be subject 
to seizure and destruction.267 
However, by seizing drugs produced under the paragraph six 
mechanism, the future ACTA parties would directly contradict the 
efforts undertaken by the WTO and its members to promote access to 
medicines in these cases. On one hand, seizures of goods in transit 
may inhibit the supply of drugs under the paragraph six mechanism 
to countries with no sufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capacities. On the other hand, ACTA’s general obligation not to 
create barriers to legitimate trade may constitute a safeguard which 
ensures the free transit of medicines produced under the paragraph 
six mechanism.268 
5. A General Shift in the IP Enforcement System? 
Apart from these specific differences between ACTA and TRIPS 
border measure standards, some are concerned about the general 
tendency of ACTA to enlarge remedies for right holders, without 
retaining the necessary checks and balances to secure the rights of 
 
manufacturing capacities. 
 266. See Intervention by India, supra note 10; Statement of Brazil, supra note 
10; India Consultation Request, supra note 2. Under Parliament & Council 
Regulation 816/2006, art. 13(1), 2006 O.J. (L 157) 1, 6 (EC) the E.U.’s 
implementation legislation regarding the “paragraph six mechanism,” the 
importation, re-exportation, or transit of drugs produced under a compulsory 
license, granted pursuant to the paragraph six mechanism, is generally prohibited 
and custom authorities must detain these drugs in accordance with Article 14 of the 
Regulation 816/2006. Drugs re-exported or in transit to an importing country that 
lacks manufacturing capacity are exempted from this prohibition, and the 
importing country is thus eligible to receive drugs produced under a compulsory 
license abroad in accordance with the paragraph six mechanism. Id. art. 13(2). It is 
nevertheless unclear whether this exemption would cover potential seizures based 
on the BMR instead of Article 13(1). 
 267. Cf. Abbott, supra note 15. 
 268. For details, see discussion supra Part III(C)(2). 
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defendants. The concerns raised by India in the October 2010 TRIPS 
Council meeting offer a good summary of the potential conflict 
between ACTA and TRIPS in this regard: 
The draft ACTA limits the protection otherwise available to accused 
infringers under the TRIPS Agreement by potentially lowering knowledge 
thresholds, limiting due process requirements (e.g., requirements to act 
within particular time frames), limiting evidentiary requirements, and by 
not specifying the type of authority empowered to make critical decisions. 
This shift to summary administrative action may curtail the rights of 
accused infringers to defend patent infringement claims, ordinary 
trademark and copyright infringement claims. This represents a 
substantial transformation from the original concept of enforcement under 
the TRIPS Agreement.269 
This article cannot offer a comprehensive analysis of whether all 
enforcement provisions in ACTA contain appropriate checks and 
balances to secure the rights of the defendant. It is worth mentioning, 
however, that ACTA contains a general rule providing that “each 
Party shall take into account the need for proportionality between the 
seriousness of the infringement, the interests of third parties, and the 
applicable measures, remedies and penalties.”270 Therefore, ACTA 
basically adopts TRIPS’s proportionality rule regarding the final fate 
of IP-infringing goods, but here as a general obligation for all 
enforcement procedures.271 This in itself is certainly a positive 
development. As a general principle, the effective functioning of 
ACTA’s proportionality rule depends on ACTA parties’ willingness 
and ability to recognize concrete and specific defenses and other 
relevant safeguards for the rights of the defendants, such as those 
contained in TRIPS Article 42 on civil enforcement and in Articles 
53 through 56 on border measures, which are absent from ACTA.  
This discrepancy places a heavy burden on the proportionality rule 
and its domestic implementation by ACTA parties. It creates 
uncertainty and legal insecurity for those bold enough to implement 
these general principles by establishing concrete and specific 
defenses tailored to the new and strengthened remedies for right 
holders. The ambiguity of the so-called “three-step test,” which 
 
 269. Concerns raised over ACTA at TRIPS Council, supra note 226. 
 270. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6(3). 
 271. Compare id., with TRIPS Agreement art. 46. 
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limits the ability of WTO members to introduce tailored exceptions 
and limitations to most IP rights in TRIPS, serves as a cautionary tale 
here.272 While it certainly can be interpreted in a balanced manner, 
the three-step test has often served as a pretext for arguing that new 
exceptions and limitations in national laws would be inconsistent 
with TRIPS.273 
Unfortunately, developing countries and small economies are 
among those most likely to be threatened with dispute settlement or 
even unilateral sanctions if they dare to implement these general 
principles in ACTA Article 6. This assumes, of course, that they 
have accepted the “irresistible” offer to comply with ACTA as part 
of an FTA-deal. The asymmetry between concrete and concise 
remedies and general checks and balances is, therefore, a systemic 
concern with ACTA. While this concern can be addressed by an 
interpretation and implementation of Article 6 that takes seriously 
the incorporation of TRIPS Articles 7 and 8, this outcome relies on 
the ability and willingness of ACTA parties to do so.  
6. The Role of TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 in Interpreting ACTA 
Before moving to the conflict analysis, it is worth reiterating some 
general observations on the appropriate interpretation of the 
substantive provisions in TRIPS and ACTA. In general, the relevant 
TRIPS and ACTA provisions are interpreted in light of their ordinary 
meaning, context, and the treaty’s object and purpose.274 As 
discussed above, Articles 7 and 8 define the object and purpose of 
TRIPS.275 All WTO members, including all ACTA negotiating 
parties, have confirmed the importance of TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 for 
 
 272. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 13, 17, 26(2), 30. In essence, these different 
versions of the test require domestic exceptions to IP exclusivity to be (1) limited, 
(2) without conflict with the normal exploitation of IP, and (3) without prejudice to 
the legitimate interests of the rightholder, taking into account legitimate interests of 
third parties. 
 273. See, e.g., Christophe Geiger et al., Declaration: A Balanced Interpretation 
of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law 1 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. 
COM. L. 119, 119 (2010), available at http://www.jipitec.eu/ 
issues/jipitec-1-2-2010/2621/Declaration-Balanced-Interpretation-Of-The-Three-
Step-Test.pdf. 
 274. VCLT, supra note 189, art. 31. 
 275. See discussion supra Part III(C)(1). 
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the interpretation of all TRIPS provisions.276 Further, WTO members 
specifically affirm that TRIPS “should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all.”277  
Through treaty interpretation, the public health dimension of the 
TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration can therefore exercise 
an important influence on the appropriate understanding of open 
treaty terms such as “legitimate trade,” “abuse,” or “country of 
importation.”278 Further, the object and purpose of TRIPS, as 
embodied in Articles 7 and 8, arguably has an impact on the 
understanding of the term “contravene” in TRIPS Article 1(2). Thus, 
the question of whether additional IP enforcement in ACTA 
“contravenes” TRIPS provisions is also guided by the balancing 
objectives and public interest principles in TRIPS Articles 7 and 8.279 
This may also result in findings of contravention in cases in which 
TRIPS-plus measures frustrate other WTO members’ abilities to 
promote social welfare, protect public health, and facilitate access to 
medicines. As this author has argued elsewhere, there is generally no 
room for such findings when additional IP protection or enforcement 
curtails an optional flexibility under TRIPS as opposed to a 
mandatory rule such as in TRIPS Articles 41(1) or 52.280 
To the extent that TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 influence the 
understanding of TRIPS, the same can be argued for ACTA since 
Article 2(3) incorporates these flexibilities by reference.281 Hence, 
 
 276. See Doha Declaration, supra note 43, ¶ 5(a) (emphasizing as one of the key 
flexibilities under TRIPS that “[i]n applying the customary rules of interpretation 
of public international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read 
in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, 
in its objectives and principles”). 
 277. Id. ¶ 4. 
 278. On the importance of TRIPS’s object and purpose as compared to the other 
main elements of treaty interpretation, see Grosse Ruse - Khan, supra note 178, at 
162. 
 279. On the meaning of the term “contravene” in light of the debate on conflict 
of norms in international law, see Grosse Ruse - Khan, supra note 38, at 67-70. 
 280. Id. at 70-73. On the similar issue of the appropriate understanding of the 
notion of “conflict” between different norms in international law, see discussion 
infra Part IV(B). 
 281. See discussion infra Part III(C)(2) (discussing how TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 
influence ACTA’s interpretation through their incorporation via ACTA Article 
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Article 2(3) both reduces the conflict potential by mandating a public 
health supportive interpretation of ACTA and increases the 
likelihood for coherence between TRIPS and ACTA.  
B. COHERENCE, NORM CONFLICT, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
Given the potential for norm conflicts between TRIPS and ACTA, 
described above, this section examines how these potential conflicts 
would be resolved under the rules and principles of public 
international law.282  
1. The Principle of Harmonious Interpretation and Systemic 
Integration 
Resolution of norm conflicts in international law is foremost 
achieved by the principle of harmonious interpretation and systemic 
integration, which operates as a presumption against conflict.283 As 
embodied in VCLT Articles 31 through 33, a harmonious treaty 
interpretation is not possible when the ordinary meaning and context 
of the two relevant terms, understood in light of the object and 
purpose of the treaties, do not permit a mutually consistent 
understanding.284  
The fact that TRIPS and ACTA essentially share the same object 
and purpose, as embodied in TRIPS Articles 7 and 8, makes a 
harmonious interpretation much easier. Several, if not most, of the 
differences mentioned above lend themselves to an integrative 
approach. For example, with regard to the ACTA options for 
defendants to post a bond or other security as a means to obtain the 
release of seized goods,285 public health considerations may 
 
2(3) and ACTA’s recognition of the principles embodied in the Doha Declaration). 
 282. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: 
How Far Can We Go? 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 535, 535-78 (2001). See generally Rep. 
of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006) [hereinafter ILC 
Conclusions] (outlining techniques of interpretation and rules of conflict resolution 
in international law). 
 283. ILC Conclusions, supra note 282, ¶¶ 4, 17-19. See generally McLachlan, 
supra note 190, at 309-19 (proposing an interpretive process to account for 
systemic integration as embodied in VCLT Article 31(3)(c)). 
 284. VCLT, supra note 189, arts. 31-33. 
 285. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 18. 
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constitute an “exceptional circumstance” given ACTA’s object and 
purpose, in which case the provision is consistent with the mandatory 
cases for such securities covered in TRIPS Article 53(2).286  
In the same vein, the general obligation in ACTA Article 6(2) to 
protect the rights of all participants in enforcement procedures can be 
understood to include the more specific obligation under TRIPS 
Article 56 to foresee right holder liability for any injury caused to 
defendants through the wrongful detention of goods. ACTA Article 
6(2) can equally facilitate a harmonious interpretation that includes 
the maximum period of initial detention set forth under TRIPS 
Article 55.  
Finally, the proportionality rule in ACTA Article 6(3) arguably 
applies in all those cases in which ACTA lacks a specific defense or 
safeguard for the defendant, but where one is present in TRIPS.287 
While this certainly does not remove the asymmetry in ACTA 
between concrete and concise remedies on the one hand and mere 
general checks and balances on the other, such asymmetry is to some 
extent mitigated by the relationship between ACTA and TRIPS. 
Thus, the absence of comprehensive and specific checks and 
balances in ACTA does not amount to a conflict of norms with 
TRIPS in light of the principles of integration and harmonious 
interpretation. 
2. Defining Norm Conflicts 
Resolving norm conflicts also involves defining what constitutes a 
true “conflict” of norms.288 In the strictest sense, a conflict exists 
only where there is a direct incompatibility such that complying with 
one rule necessitates the violation of another.289 The WTO Appellate 
Body seems to follow this view.290 Still, this is not the only 
 
 286. On the interpretation of this and other ambiguous terms in ACTA in light 
of TRIPS Articles 7 and 8, see discussion supra Part III(C)(1). 
 287. On the role of the general proportionality rule, see discussion supra Part 
IV(A)(5). 
 288. See generally JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003). 
 289. See id. at 167 (discussing the “technical approach” to conflict in 
international law). 
 290. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Guatemala Anti-Dumping Investigation 
Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, ¶ 65, WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 2, 1998) 
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perspective on norm conflict: a broader view finds conflicts when a 
treaty obligation limits or prevents the exercise of a right provided by 
another treaty.291 
In the TRIPS context, if this broader definition of conflict prevails, 
a TRIPS-plus rule in ACTA may be in conflict with an optional 
TRIPS provision as soon as it limits the ability of a WTO member to 
exercise a right or flexibility provided by TRIPS. Whenever such a 
conflict then is decided in favor of the TRIPS provision, this 
approach could be argued as making TRIPS flexibilities inviolable 
and untouchable. Some support for such a position comes from the 
Doha Declaration in which WTO members “reaffirm the right of 
WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS 
Agreement, which provide flexibility” for the purpose of public 
health protection.292 
On the other hand, such a far reaching effect may appear to 
contradict the overall notion of optional flexibilities in TRIPS. Since 
WTO members implement optional flexibilities through domestic 
law, if a WTO member thus decides to waive its right to use a certain 
flexibility allowed under TRIPS, this is equally a way of exercising 
its right and part of the flexibility TRIPS provides. Thus, applying a 
wide notion of norm conflict so as to prevent a WTO member from 
making such a decision could be viewed as turning an optional rule 
into a mandatory one. 
However, one must bear in mind that a broad understanding of 
what constitutes a norm conflict in international law does not pre-
determine the answer to the question which of the conflicting norms 
prevails. This is a separate analysis governed by the applicable 
conflict resolution tools in either of the conflicting bodies of norms 
or in general international law.293 Hence, adopting a wide 
understanding of norm conflict does not imply TRIPS flexibilities 
prevailing over TRIPS-plus provisions in subsequent international IP 
treaties such as ACTA. It merely widens the scope of conflict 
 
(defining conflict as “a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to 
the violation of the other provision”). 
 291. See Pauwelyn, supra note 282, at 551. For an overview on various different 
approaches to conflicts or inconsistencies, see ILC Conclusions, supra note 282; 
PAUWELYN, supra note 288, at 167-174. 
 292. Doha Declaration, supra note 43, ¶ 4. 
 293. See discussion infra Part IV(B)(3). 
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resolution analysis to include the relationship between optional rights 
under TRIPS and subsequent curtailments of these rights in TRIPS-
plus rules.  
In the context of the ACTA-TRIPS relationship, some of the 
arguments above speak in favor of adopting a narrow definition of 
norm conflict, which means that a conflict only exists when 
compliance with one rule necessitates the violation of another rule.294 
This approach also aligns with the understanding of the term 
“contravene” in TRIPS Article 1(1).295 However, the resolution of 
norm conflicts becomes more limited and technical under this 
approach. The narrow definition of conflict would not eradicate the 
conflict potential between TRIPS and ACTA, as long as it is based 
on the operation of mandatory TRIPS limits to additional IP 
protection and a corresponding obligation for such an additional 
protection in ACTA. For example, if the final ACTA text would 
have mandated the seizure of generics in transit, as discussed above, 
TRIPS obligations would be violated by complying with such an 
ACTA obligation.296 But a narrow definition excludes an important 
part of potential conflicts, namely the relation between TRIPS 
flexibilities and subsequent TRIPS-plus rules, from its scope. A 
wider understanding of norm conflict avoids that and appears more 
apt to address the need for policy coherence between TRIPS and 
ACTA.297 In the end, the main argument in favor of a wider 
understanding is that it does not conflate conflict definition and 
conflict resolution. As a conflict resolution tool, Article 1(1) TRIPS 
and its notion of “contravening” also have no bearing on what should 
constitute a norm conflict between TRIPS and ACTA. Instead, it is 
only relevant in the resolution of conflicts discussed below.  
Among the ACTA–TRIPS differences discussed in Part IV(A) 
above, those pertaining to the scope of border measures under ACTA 
fall inside the wide definition of conflict. In particular the mandatory 
extension of the types of IP infringements to be covered by border 
 
 294. On the operation of the specific ACTA conflict clause, see discussion supra 
Part IV(B)(2). 
295.  See discussion supra Part II(B). 
 296. See discussion supra Part III(A)(2). 
 297. Such coherence is increasingly claimed between the ability to exercise 
TRIPS flexibilities and TRIPS-plus IP provisions in FTAs. See TRIPS-plus 
Enforcement China, supra note 37; TRIPS-plus Enforcement India, supra note 37. 
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measures under ACTA curtails the flexibilities TRIPS foresees in 
this regard.298 Another norm conflict may exist if one finds that 
ACTA does not adhere to the relevant safeguards for traders and 
goods owners in TRIPS. As explained above, however, the specific 
safeguards contained in TRIPS Articles 53-56 can be encompassed 
by the general checks and balances rules in ACTA Article 6.299 Here, 
a harmonious interpretation mitigates any potential conflict. 
This also applies to the safeguard against IP enforcement 
functioning as a barrier to legitimate trade under TRIPS Article 
41(1). Given that ACTA contains a verbatim copy of this rule in its 
Article 6(1), any implementation of ACTA that creates barriers to 
legitimate trade equally conflicts with ACTA Article 6(1).300 ACTA 
and TRIPS therefore both prohibit the application of border IP 
enforcement in a way that inhibits international trade and especially 
the free transit of generic medicines. This result also speaks against 
findings of norm conflict in the implementation of the “paragraph six 
mechanism” on the exportation of medicines to countries with 
insufficient manufacturing capacities. Implementing ACTA in a way 
that inhibits the trade and transfer of medicines produced under this 
mechanism would already amount to a violation of Article 6(1).  
However, a norm conflict—even in its narrow meaning—may 
exist in relation to the different applicable law rules. While TRIPS 
Article 52 requires adequate evidence of infringement “under the 
laws of the country of importation,” ACTA Article 17(1) demands 
such evidence based on the “laws of the Party providing the 
procedures.” Does adherence with one rule hence lead to 
inconsistency with the other? For allegedly infringing imported 
goods, the applicable law is that of the importing country under both 
TRIPS and ACTA. For goods in transit, however, the distinct rules 
lead to the law of the importing country under TRIPS, and to the law 
of the transit country under ACTA. A broad interpretation of 
“country of importation,” under TRIPS Article 52, to include the 
transit country may be a way to harmonize the provisions. In 
applying the VCLT interpretative rules, however, the object and 
 
 298. Cf. discussion supra Part IV(A)(5). 
 299. See discussion supra Part IV(B)(1). 
 300. See discussion supra Part III(C)(2). 
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purpose of TRIPS work against such broad interpretation.301 Since 
the VCLT rules of interpretation delineate the limits of the concept 
of harmonious interpretation to prevent norm conflicts, ACTA 
Article 17(1) is therefore in conflict with TRIPS Article 52. 
3. Conflict Resolution Tools in TRIPS and ACTA 
Conflict resolution depends on the applicable conflict resolution 
rules, which may derive from either of the two treaties or from 
general international law.302 Although TRIPS Article 1(1) does not 
directly address the consistency of additional IP protection in 
international treaties, but instead refers to additional protection in 
domestic law, it should be understood as the relevant TRIPS conflict 
norm in relation to additional IP protection in general.303 As 
discussed above, Article 1(1) prohibits additional IP protection that 
contravenes TRIPS provisions and hence only upholds a binding 
TRIPS norm constraining additional IP protection over subsequent 
contrary obligations in relations between WTO members.304 From the 
WTO/TRIPS perspective, the obligations under TRIPS Article 52 
constrain the ability of WTO members to set contravening standards 
in ACTA. The flexibilities under TRIPS Article 51 on the other hand 
allow extending border measures beyond the minimum scope of 
imports of trademark counterfeits and pirated copyright goods. 
Doing so constitutes an optional right which a WTO member may 
choose to exercise. The ACTA obligations which mandate a wider 
scope affect this right, but do not “contravene” TRIPS in the sense of 
Article 1(1). As argued above, finding a TRIPS-plus rule to 
contravene a TRIPS flexibility in effect turns an optional provision 
into a mandatory one.305 
The relevant conflict resolution rule in ACTA sets out as a central 
 
 301. See Grosse Ruse - Khan & Jaeger, supra note 48, at 534-36; discussion 
supra Part II. 
 302. Cf. Pauwelyn, supra note 282, at 544-45. 
 303. Cf. Letter from Pascal Lamy, supra note 233. For a more detailed 
discussion, see Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan, The International Law Relation 
Between TRIPS and Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards 
Safeguarding TRIPS Flexibilities?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. (forthcoming 2011). 
 304. See discussion supra Part IV(A). 
305. See discussion supra Part IV(B)(2). For further details, see also Grosse 
Ruse - Khan, supra note 303. 
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tenet its intention to respect existing agreements, including TRIPS.306 
Thus, ACTA expresses the intention of the negotiating parties not to 
derogate from any WTO/TRIPS obligations. The final ACTA text 
uses only the term “obligations,” as opposed to the use of “rights and 
obligations” in the conflicts clauses of some FTAs. This suggests 
that the negotiating parties believe the future ACTA may prevail 
over optional TRIPS flexibilities. But as far as TRIPS obligations are 
concerned, namely binding limits to additional IP protection, those 
would prevail in the event of a conflict in the narrow sense defined 
above. Thus, the two conflict norms in TRIPS and ACTA lead to 
equivalent and consistent results: TRIPS would prevail over ACTA 
only in case of a conflict with a mandatory TRIPS limit on additional 
IP protection. 
Therefore, in relation to the conflict between TRIPS Article 52 
and ACTA Article 17(1), the binding obligation in TRIPS prevails 
over ACTA. While ACTA Article 1 mandates this result, Article 
16(2) explicitly allows border measures against goods in transit.307 
The applicable law rule in ACTA Article 17(1) leads to the 
application of the law of the transit country, which conflicts with 
TRIPS despite the intention in ACTA Article 1 not to derogate from 
TRIPS. The best way to resolve this problem is to redraft ACTA’s 
applicable law rule. If this does not happen, the most appropriate 
solution is to apply TRIPS Article 52 to cases where the ACTA rule 
leads to conflicting results. Thus, if a future ACTA party decides to 
extend border measures to goods in transit, their IP-infringing 
character must nevertheless be decided on the basis of the law of the 
country of importation, understood as the country of final 
destination, and not the law of the transit country. 
Interestingly, in the July ACTA text, some negotiating parties 
proposed a different version of Article 1 which would have ensured 
that ACTA would not derogate from existing rights and obligations 
that the ACTA parties owe one another under TRIPS—“Nothing in 
this Agreement shall derogate from [EU/NZ/Sing: any existing rights 
and] any obligation of a Party with respect to another Party under 
existing agreements, including [TRIPS].”308 The bracketed addition, 
 
 306. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 1. 
 307. Id. art. 16(2). 
 308. ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 1.1. 
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proposed by the E.U., New Zealand, and Singapore, would have also 
ensured that ACTA would not derogate from existing rights the 
ACTA parties owe one another under TRIPS. In the subsequent 
ACTA draft leaked in August 2010, however, the text referred only 
to “obligations.”309 Still, the question arises whether language along 
the lines of the July ACTA text might function to safeguard TRIPS 
flexibilities insofar as their operation is undermined by ACTA 
provisions. 
This seems unlikely, however, for many reasons. First, the 
negotiating parties may understand “rights and obligations” with 
respect to each other as describing a treaty obligation in international 
law from a dual perspective where the obligation of one party is the 
right of another party. If so, the term would still only apply to 
obligations in international law and not as a safeguard for TRIPS 
flexibilities as optional treaty rights. Second, even if one assumes 
that the bracketed text applies to TRIPS flexibilities, it is limited to 
rights that future ACTA parties owe to each other. If these countries 
decide to waive rights by not exercising certain TRIPS flexibilities, 
then any ACTA provision that undermines the use of such a 
flexibility would arguably not derogate from such a right within the 
meaning of the July draft of Article 1. Finally, because ACTA 
contains specific TRIPS-plus rules, the only interpretation of which 
undermines the exercise of TRIPS flexibilities, the operation of 
Article 1 cannot lead to a result which renders the specific TRIPS-
plus provision inutile or ineffective.310 In sum, it remains rather 
doubtful that the bracketed addition in the July version of Article 1 
would operate to prevent specific TRIPS-plus rules in ACTA from 
undermining TRIPS flexibilities. Only where such rules in ACTA are 
open-textured or ambiguous in their impact on TRIPS would such a 
version of Article 1 safeguard TRIPS flexibilities.311 
 
 309. See ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 59, art. 1.1 (“Nothing in this 
Agreement shall derogate from any obligation [NZ/US/Kor/J/CH/Mex/Can/Sing: 
of a Party with respect to any other Party] under existing agreements, including the 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.”). 
 310. As explained in supra note 216, this follows from the application of the 
principle of good faith in treaty interpretation as embodied in VCLT, supra note 
189, art. 31 (1). 
 311. This result would however already follow from the principle of harmonious 
interpretation as discussed supra Part IV(B)(1). 
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4. Conflict Rules in General International Law  
General international law conflict norms support the findings of 
the previous section. VCLT Article 30 concerns the application of 
successive treaties on the same subject matter.312 According to VCLT 
Article 30(2), TRIPS should prevail in the event of an 
incompatibility, given ACTA’s intent not to derogate expressed in 
Article 1.313  
In addition, ACTA may also be subject to VCLT Article 41, which 
concerns inter-se agreements to modify multilateral treaties between 
certain of the parties.314 In relation to the WTO/TRIPS Agreement, 
ACTA constitutes an inter-se agreement since it would be concluded 
amongst some members of the WTO and modify the TRIPS 
enforcement obligations as between themselves, mainly by adopting 
stronger standards. This would make ACTA’s applicability in 
relation to TRIPS subject to the requirements of VCLT Article 41. 
One issue that arises is whether TRIPS Article 1(1) can be viewed as 
a “possibility for modification” under VCLT Article 41(1). If so, the 
qualification not to contravene TRIPS would be decisive for the 
ACTA-TRIPS relationship.  
If one does not view TRIPS Article 1(1) as such a clause 
conditionally allowing subsequent inter-se treaties, then ACTA is a 
valid inter-se modification of TRIPS enforcement standards so long 
as the requirements of VCLT Article 41(1)(b) are met.315 The main 
issue here would be whether any modification, namely stronger IP 
enforcement standards, relates to a TRIPS provision, “derogation 
 
 312. On the operation of Article 30 of the Vienna Convention as a conflict norm, 
see ILC Conclusions, supra note 282, ¶ 24; Grosse Ruse - Khan, supra note 303. 
 313. VCLT, supra note 189, art. 30(2) (“When a treaty specifies that it is subject 
to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, 
the provisions of the other treaty prevail” in the event of an incompatibility). 
 314. Id. art. 41. The conditions set out by Article 41 do not necessarily lead to 
the invalidity of the relevant inter-se treaty norm; rather, the consequences depend 
on an interpretation of the original treaty. See ILC Conclusions, supra note 282, ¶ 
29. In relation to the original multilateral treaty, one might generally assume mere 
inapplicability, instead of invalidity, of the of the relevant inter-se treaty norm. 
 315. VCLT, supra note 189, art. 41(1)(b) (providing that parties to a multilateral 
treaty may alter the treaty as to themselves if “the modification in question is not 
prohibited by the treaty and (i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of 
their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations; (ii) does not 
relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with the effective 
execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole”). 
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from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object 
and purpose of the treaty as a whole.”316 Specifically, the question is 
whether any ACTA TRIPS-plus standard derogates from a TRIPS 
rule in a way that is incompatible with the TRIPS objectives 
expressed in Articles 7 and 8.317 ACTA fails to meet the requirements 
of VCLT Article 41(1)(b), therefore, only in situations where ACTA 
rules cannot be cured of their incompatibility with TRIPS through 
the incorporation of TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 by reference, mainly 
where ACTA uses precise treaty language that is immune to an 
interpretation in light of Article 7 and 8.318 
Given the very general terms used in the balancing objectives and 
public interest principles of TRIPS, this standard seems difficult to 
apply. Since the effect of inter-se modifications is generally confined 
to the national IP regimes of the modifying parties, the inter-se 
derogation from TRIPS flexibilities, as such, cannot be viewed as 
incompatible with the “effective execution of the object and purpose 
of the treaty as a whole.”319 Instead, the operation of VCLT Article 
41 should require an effect on other WTO members and their ability 
to implement the TRIPS objectives.320 If a TRIPS-plus inter-se treaty 
inhibits the ability of other WTO members to exercise their rights 
under TRIPS, i.e., to use the TRIPS flexibilities effectively, then 
such a modification also violates VCLT Article 41(1)(b)(ii). That 
means, would ACTA mandate the seizures of generics in transit in 
any way, the negative impact on other WTO members’ right to rely 
on TRIPS flexibilities, such as the Doha “paragraph six mechanism,” 
would violate VCLT Article 41(1)(b). However, as argued above, the 
prohibition on the creation of trade barriers under ACTA Article 6(1) 
should serve as a safeguard against such a negative impact on the 
“paragraph six mechanism.”  
Finally, ACTA may also pose a problem under VCLT Article 
 
 316. On the application of VCLT Article 41 in relation to TRIPS and FTAs in 
general, see Andrew D. Mitchell & Tania Voon, Patents and Public Health in the 
WTO, FTAs and Beyond: Tension and Conflict in International Law, 43 WORLD J. 
TRADE 571, 571-601 (2009); Grosse Ruse - Khan, supra note 303. 
 317. On the role of Articles 7 and 8 as the object and purpose of TRIPS, see 
Doha Declaration, supra note 43, ¶ 5. 
 318. On the operation and limits of TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 as ACTA treaty 
objectives, see discussion supra Part III(C)(1). 
 319. VCLT, supra note 189, art. 41(1)(b)(ii). 
 320. This is also consistent with VCLT Article 41(1)(b)(i). See supra note 315. 
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41(2).321 Unless the ACTA negotiating parties have discharged their 
notification duty in respect of all other WTO members, they are 
acting in violation of the VCLT.322 That said, it is doubtful that a 
violation of VCLT Article 41(2) will have any practical effect. 
In sum, the general international law conflict rules, especially 
those contained in VCLT Articles 30 and 41, support the results 
found under the specific conflict clauses in TRIPS Article 1(1) and 
ACTA Article 1. To the extent that TRIPS contains a binding limit 
on additional IP protection and enforcement, it will prevail over 
ACTA. On the other hand, optional TRIPS flexibilities are unlikely 
to prevail over TRIPS-plus obligations under ACTA, unless ACTA 
violates requirements established in VLCT Article 41(1)(b) by 
affecting the rights of other WTO members to exercise these 
flexibilities.323  
CONCLUSION 
This article has reviewed the ACTA provisions on border 
measures against the backdrop of Dutch seizures of generics in 
transit, and the resulting initiation of dispute settlement proceedings 
by India and Brazil against both the E.U. and the Netherlands. 
According to both India and Brazil, the E.U. and Dutch measures are 
inconsistent with TRIPS Articles 1(1) and 41 and other TRIPS norms 
from the section on border measures (Articles 51-60). These alleged 
infringements do not result from a failure to meet the TRIPS 
minimum standards of IP protection and enforcement; rather, it is the 
TRIPS-plus character of the measures that led to the seizure of 
generics in transit. Thus, for the first time in WTO dispute 
settlement, TRIPS has been used as a benchmark for constraining 
additional IP protection. Given this new perspective on TRIPS, the 
 
 321. VCLT, supra note 189, art. 41(2) (requiring the modifying parties to notify 
any other parties to the agreement of their intent to modify and the proposed 
modification). 
 322. The WTO notification mechanism with respect to Regional Trade 
Agreements under Article XXIV of GATT or Article V of GATS apparently has 
not been used by the ACTA negotiating parties. See Regional Trade Agreements 
Information System, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://rtais.wto.org/UI/Public Maintain 
RTAHome.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 323. Note that this would also violate the general principle that “[a] treaty does 
not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.” VLCT, 
supra note 189, art. 34. 
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TRIPS-plus elements contained in ACTA, which relate to IP 
enforcement at the border, warrant close scrutiny. 
While the final ACTA text does not mandate the extension of 
border measures against goods in transit, it certainly allows the 
detention of goods suspected of infringing trademarks and patents in 
the transit country. This can easily lead to the seizure of transiting 
generics, similar to the Dutch seizures previously mentioned. ACTA 
parties have the option to avoid this threat because the enforcement 
mechanisms threatening the international trade in generic drugs are 
not mandatory. Moreover, future ACTA parties have a general 
obligation to prevent IP enforcement procedures from creating 
barriers to legitimate trade. As argued above, this obligation acts to 
prohibit future ACTA parties from implementing ACTA in a way 
that inhibits the international trade and transit in generic medicines. 
This understanding of ACTA’s safeguards against trade barriers 
finds support in its incorporation of TRIPS Article 7 and 8, which 
play a strong interpretative role in the understanding of ACTA 
norms. 
Although ACTA contains a general obligation to protect the rights 
of defendants and third parties, ACTA provides comprehensive and 
concise provisions on remedies that asymmetrically protect rights 
holders. This imbalance raises systemic concerns because it places 
the burden of a proportional, fair, and equitable enforcement system 
primarily on ACTA parties. Therefore, future ACTA parties must 
take these general obligations seriously and draft concrete defenses 
and other safeguards for all those affected by the new extended 
remedies. It remains to be seen whether the uncertainty inherent in 
the general obligations will prevent developing countries, in 
particular, from doing so.  
In acknowledging that TRIPS contains both minimum and 
maximum standards for IP protection and enforcement, it follows 
that TRIPS can constrain the ability of WTO members to enter into 
TRIPS-plus agreements like ACTA. In the case of ACTA, however, 
most TRIPS-plus border measure obligations do not amount to 
contravention of TRIPS provisions. First, ACTA’s general 
obligations can be interpreted harmoniously with the specific 
safeguards for free trade in TRIPS Article 53 through 56. Second, a 
contravention of TRIPS provisions does not exist when merely 
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optional TRIPS flexibilities are undermined by more stringent IP 
enforcement under ACTA. The TRIPS and ACTA rules on the 
applicable law for judging the IP infringing character of goods in 
transit are the only provisions truly in contravention. Here, conflict 
resolution provisions in ACTA, TRIPS, and general international law 
operate to prioritize the application of TRIPS Article 52 over ACTA 
Article 17(1) to the extent of conflict. This example highlights the 
need to redraft certain of ACTA’s provisions to create consistency 
with the TRIPS Agreement.  
Finally, if ACTA’s negotiating parties were to truly take seriously 
their pledge for TRIPS consistency, they should also have strived for 
policy coherence. Rather than including a few general checks and 
balances for the defendant, the negotiating parties should have 
crafted specific safeguards for all interested parties affected by the 
ACTA enforcement rules in order to counterbalance the 
comprehensive new remedies created for rights holders. It is this 
asymmetry that creates the gravest systemic concerns with ACTA. 
 
